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SUMMARY
PASTORALISTS, POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS \ KENNEDY MKUTU 
Pastoral counties of northern Kenya are expected to undergo massive change in the 
coming years due to the government’s ambitious infrastructural development agenda. 
However, the area frequently experiences violence as a result of conflict between pasto-
ralist communities, and also due to ethno-political contestations. Isiolo County is one 
such place where planned development projects and conflict risks coincide, making it 
an important case study for understanding how the future may unfold.  
This Working Paper is written in the framework of a larger project called “Future Rural 
Africa: Future-making and social-ecological transformation” by the Universities of 
Bonn and Cologne and BICC (Bonn International Center for Conversion). BICC is inter-
ested in the kinds of claims that are being made on land and its resources and how 
these may change the existing dynamics of organised violence. The Paper explores the 
complexity of existing conflict in Isiolo and the emerging effects of new plans and land 
claims. At its most basic level, conflict between pastoral groups, or between pastoralists 
and farmers is motivated both by survival (pastoral mobility and access to water and 
pasture in a climatically challenging area) and the accumulation of livestock wealth. 
Politics, which is generally extended along ethnic lines, adds another layer to the in-
ter-communal conflict through the need for political survival and the accumulation of 
personal wealth. The devolution of many powers and budgets to county level since 2013 
has then raised the stakes for political power. Since plans for infrastructure have been 
made known, tensions have emerged, and fears of exclusion and dispossession of cus-
tomary land users through speculative land-grabbing and uncompensated state acquisi-
tion. With Isiolo being a hub of the illicit small arms trade, guns have become a conflict 
multiplier at every level. 
The county is highly securitised with several specialised police units. However, they lack 
capacity and their actions have tended to be either inadequate or overly reactive and 
their relationship with communities is poor. As a result, day to day security of pastoralist 
communities and their livestock relies on the rather informal and unprofessional  
National Police Reserve, who are armed by the state, and community members, who 
purchase their own arms through illicit markets. Politicians on occasion have also sup-
plied arms and ammunition to communities. The Paper concludes that the various layers 
of conflict should be considered and addressed simultaneously, and that development is 
a new and potent factor in conflict at both political and community levels. A careful,  
inclusive conflict-sensitive approach to development is essential, but this is unlikely to 
happen if leaders look for personal power and gain. 
2 \ 
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Community conservancies are a  
relatively recent development and  
are bringing about new concerns  
about resource conflict and security 
governance
Increasingly, local community members are be-
ing recruited as National Police Reservists to guard 
them. And more communities are forming conserv-
ancies, partly to benefit from this. Thus, the function 
of conservancies has gone beyond the conventional 
model of wildlife protection. Sometimes, conservan-
cies and their designated National Police Reservists 
contribute to resource-based intercommunal conflict. 
Probably the most significant conflict 
risk is the struggle for political power 
and control over the benefits of devel-
opment, along with the danger of 
displacement and exclusion of pasto-
ralists by those same developments.  
Isiolo has communities whose economic, political 
and security needs are not met, and several indica-
tors exist that this might lead to conflict in the future. 
Communities along the Isiolo–Meru border in par-
ticular, are already engaged in low-level but deadly 
inter-communal conflict. This is fuelled by a politi-
cised inter-county boundary conflict, which in turn  
is exacerbated by the desire to control the benefits of 
the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport 
(LAPSSET) corridor and associated developments.
Various layers of conflict may be  
observed in Isiolo County, from inter-
communal resource-based conflict  
to political conflict and conflict over 
the benefits of new resources and  
development 
These are often expressed at the community level 
and have led to deadly clashes in the distant and  
recent past. The county has several contextual factors 
which contribute to conflict, including a history of 
mutual animosity between the inhabitants of the 
area and the state encapsulated in the Shifta War; a 
semi-arid climate which leads to pastoralist move-
ments into the county from more arid areas; a diverse 
population comprising five main ethnic groups which 
have seen intense political competition; and most  
recently, the anticipation of large-scale investment 
and development projects which raise the stakes for 
power and control.    
Small arms proliferation is a result  
of its free supply into Isiolo and the 
high demand for arms, as well as the 
creation of community armed militia 
by the state
Isiolo pastoralists are well armed, and localised 
arms races usually result from their need to protect 
herds, particularly where state security structures  
are not functioning to protect people. National Police 
Reservists are one solution to this, but the force  
has a reputation for unprofessionalism, and their 
governance is flawed.
Main findings
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In July 2018, three people died in a violent con-
frontation between police and members of the ethnic 
Turkana community in Ngaremara ward near Isiolo 
town. The case vividly illustrates the complex multi- 
layered nature of armed violence in a county that  
represents the gateway to Kenya’s northern region. 
According to an administrator, cattle which had  
allegedly been stolen some months previously from 
Samburu pastoralists were found in a Turkana area. 1 
The national government together with some local 
community organisations had attempted a dialogue 
and peace initiatives, but ultimately the Turkana 
communityrefused to give up the cattle, which led to 
the deployment of regular police and General Service 
Unit (GSU) forces, with armoured vehicles to villages 
in the area. Women recalled running to hide in the 
bush with children, fearing the added threat of wild 
elephants2,  while some community members used 
their guns to resist the operations. 3 According to  
media reports, three community members were 
killed, some were injured in the crossfire, and an esti-
mated 3,000 people from three villages were tempo-
rarily displaced (Dibondo, 2018). At some point in the 
confrontation, an Administration Police (AP) officer 
within the local AP camp was also brutally attacked 
and killed by the Turkana community. 4 People sus-
pected that the raid might have had less to do with 
recovering cattle, and more to do with displacing 
them to make way for development projects (Dibondo, 
2018). Local politicians who encouraged the commu-
nity members to hide the cattle further complicated 
the situation. 5
This Paper examines the multiple layers of armed 
conflict in Isiolo county, as illustrated by the opening 
example, against the background of planned new in-
vestments in the area. Isiolo, in Kenya’s geographical 
centre (see Map 1) is a county in which the various 
types of violence are showcased, while at the same 
time being a centre of planned development to be  
 
1 \  Senior national government administrator, Isiolo town, 23 November 
2018.
2 \  Interview, elderly Turkana woman, Ngaremara. 18 August 2018.
3 \  Phone interview, conservancy staff, 23 November 2018.
4 \  Phone interview, District Peace Committee member and fellow church 
member of the deceased, 23 November 2018.
5 \  Noted in interviews with peace workers and a high-level administrator, 
Isiolo, September 2018.
Introduction
traversed by one of Vision 2030’s flagship projects, the 
Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) 
corridor, which is intended to connect Kenya’s coast 
with the country’s northern interior and with neigh-
bouring countries. The county is also regionally im-
portant as a transport hub, as several roads link it to 
Nairobi and South Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia and 
is set to be the site for a future oil refinery. Isiolo is a 
member of the Frontier Counties Development Council 
(FCDC), whose members have collectively received 
nearly KSh 120 billion (US $1.2 billion) worth of fund-
ing for various large-scale projects (Abdimalik, 2019). 
The confluence of planned development and conflict 
risks justifies showcasing Isiolo as a representative 
case-study for understanding how the future may 
unfold regarding claims that are being made on land 
and its resources and how these may change existing 
dynamics of organised violence.
The opening scenario illustrates the complex  
nature of armed conflict evident in Isiolo (see Figure 1). 
The range of actors involved is broad and includes 
both state security personnel and non-state militias, 
most of whom are armed, which intensifies conflict 
and its impacts. This study proposes to analyse multi- 
layered conflict in Isiolo. At its most basic level, con-
flict in Isiolo is often an inter-communal resource- 
based conflict between different ethnic pastoral 
groups or between pastoralists and farmers, driven 
by the need to survive and the motive to accumulate 
wealth. Livestock is wealth and carries status and  
cultural value. Compared to cattle, camels and goats 
have recently gained in currency in Isiolo, as they are 
more resistant to drought. Politics, which is generally 
extended along ethnic lines, is the next layer of the 
conflict typology and brings in factors such as group 
interests, for which the politician has promised to act, 
but also personal interests of politicians such as po-
litical survival and personal wealth. This leads to a 
range of actions (including violent manipulation of 
voting blocks and creation and arming of militias) 
which play into conflict dynamics at the lower levels.
PASTORALISTS, POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS \ KENNEDY MKUTU  
8 \ \ WORKING PAPER 7  \ 2019
This Paper examines the phenomenon of armed 
conflict in Isiolo, its nature, characteristics and actors, 
and in particular the various causes or factors in the 
conflicts and their relation to each other. Both histor-
ical and recent phenomena are explored. The work 
documents how the marginalisation of Isiolo and 
other northern counties in conjunction with civil war 
in several neighbouring countries have influenced 
both the unhindered supply of arms and the demand 
for them as a consequence of the fact that the state 
does not protect communities from cattle raids.
This work is the result of desk-based research  
and visits to Isiolo County, during which the author 
carried out interviews and focus-group discussions 
with local and county administrators and community 
members including youths, women and elders from 
Borana, Somali, Turkana, and Meru communities,  
national government, civil society and faith-based  
organisations (elders) peace organisations and con-
servancies. Regular phone contact with some of the 
respondents has assisted in keeping the work up-to-
date in view of new emerging conflicts in Ngaremara 
where LAPSSET is anticipated. It also draws on the 
author’s extensive previous fieldwork in the county 
and the region on conflict, violence, policing and 
peace-building and therefore refers to the reports en-
suing from this (Mkutu & Boru, 2018; Mkutu, Otieno, 
Gioto, Wandera, Kajumbi and Palmreuther, 2017; 
Mkutu, 2008). Desk-based research made use of the 
Kenya National Archive, parliamentary proceedings, 
the Armed Conflict Location Data Project (ACLED)6  
and media articles, various reports by government 
and civil society, and academic papers.
6 \  The main limitation of the highly informative ACLED database is that 
it relies on media reports, which may be imprecise or inaccurate in 
terms of details and geographical location, especially in remote and 
conflict-prone areas. Occasionally, local media reports are not included.
Devolution to county level since 2013 has reduced 
the “winner takes all” dynamics at the national level 
but has created new county wealth and new positions, 
new power balances and new conflicts instead. Finally, 
new types of resources and benefits of local develop-
ment provide another focus for ethnopolitical com-
petition over control of the new wealth and generate 
grievances about exclusion and dispossession. Small 
arms are part of the picture, intensifying every level 
of conflict.
Figure 1: Layers and factors in the conflict in Isiolo County 
 
Source: Mkutu, 2019           © BICC
Some specific aspects of this multi-layered model 
must be emphasised. Climatic pressures (frequent 
drought) make land and water sources to be the object 
of competition between pastoralist groups. Further, 
Isiolo is inhabited by several large ethnic groups.  
At the same time, the informal land tenure system, 
which applies to most land occupied by pastoralists 
in Kenya, makes land an easy target to be taken for 
public and even private use, displacing customary 
users and increasing competition and conflict. Last, 
Isiolo has a history as a small arms hub which ena-
bles and exacerbates conflict. 
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The location of Isiolo between the fertile south 
and the arid north makes Isiolo a site for seasonal 
migration of nomadic pastoralists. Further, the 
unique narrow panhandle in which Isiolo town is  
located gives the county extensive borders with other 
counties. These geographical features influence con-
flict dynamics as will be described. The Ewaso Nyiro 
River traverses most of the county and forms the border 
between Merti sub-county (containing Chari and 
Cherab wards) and Garbatulla sub-county (containing 
Sericho, Garbatulla and Kinna wards) to the east. To 
the west, it forms the border between neighbouring 
Samburu County and the third sub-county also 
known as Isiolo (containing Ngaremara, Burat, Bulla 
Pesa, Wabera and Oldonyiro wards) (see Map 1).
The county is by no means the worst in Kenya in 
terms of development indicators, but it is below aver-
age (the Human Development Index is 0.333 as com-
pared to the national average of 0.555) (KNBS, 2009), 
and 65 per cent of its population live below the pover-
ty line (national average 45%) (Wambui Mwang, T., 
2014). The county is a major site for planned large-scale 
national developments. The LAPSSET Corridor is 
planned to traverse the county, and there is a possi-
bility for a resort city in either Kipsing Gap, Oldonyiro 
ward, Kula Mawe, Kinna ward, or possibly in the 
north of Meru County, that is to contain high-end 
shopping and tourist hotels. The city’s water needs 
are to be supplied by the creation of dams on the 
western section of the Ewaso Nyiro River. There have 
been major road-building projects such as the recently 
completed Isiolo-Moyale road, which proceeds to 
Moyale on the northern border with Ethiopia and  
beyond, and an East-West highway which is still in 
progress. The new developments herald opportuni-
ties for residents, but also dangers of dispossession 
from community- owned land and resources, exclu-
sion and other unwanted socio-cultural impacts.
Features of Isiolo County
Isiolo County is located in the centre of Kenya,  
almost directly north of Nairobi. Its county capital—
Isiolo town (see Map 1)—has long been considered by 
successive governments as a strategic “gateway” to 
the vast semi-arid and arid northern reaches of the 
country, and beyond, connecting Kenya to the Horn 
of Africa.
Isiolo is a highly ethnically diverse county, with 
five main ethnic groups and several minorities. The 
Borana are the majority and occupy the largest share 
of land, while the Somali, Samburu and Turkana peo-
ple are also pastoralist livestock keepers, as befits the 
semi-arid climatic conditions. The Meru, however 
(who are the majority in Meru County to the south), 
are settled farming people. These communities com-
pete for scarce resources and also differ from one  
another to greater or lesser extents in terms of per-
ceived indigeneity, livelihood strategies, religion and 
custom, and favour shown to them by colonial and 
post-colonial governments, which have often pitted 
them against each other as will be described. Most land 
in the county is community land, held in trust by the 
county government for the collective land-holders.
Source: Isiolo County Integrated Development Plan 2019
Map 1  
Isiolo County wards
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Under colonial rule, until 1928, Isiolo was a depot 
for ox-trains supplying Kings African Rifles (an African 
military force formed in 1902) (Clayton & Killingray, 
1989) stationed in the Northern Frontier District (NFD, 
comprising Garissa, Mandera, Wajir, Moyale, Marsabit 
and Isiolo districts). Some ex-soldiers were settled in 
Isiolo by the British following their service in World 
War I; these were from the Isaq and Herti Somali 
clans (Whittaker, 2012),7  and other residents from 
these clans also settled in the town. In 1929, Isiolo 
was formed as a district and became a strategic base 
for patrols into the NFD (KNA, 1932).
Hjort (1979, p. 16) commented on the marginalisa-
tion of the district and the entire NFD which was  
geographically and climatically challenging, a land of 
“heat, wind and dust” which was “… administered at 
minimal cost, at least up to the Second World War, 
with the sole intention of keeping ‘Pax Britannica’ 
sufficiently effective to prevent the expansion of 
Ethiopia and other interests in the area” (Hjort, 1979). 
Isiolo gradually developed, with a growing trade in 
livestock and maizemeal amongst other goods, which 
was controlled mainly by Somali and Asian traders 
(Hjort 1979). Other inhabitants of the now Isiolo 
County included nomadic Samburu, Ndorobo (Laikipia 
Maasai) and some Somalis in the Isiolo town area  
before the Europeans arrived. The Borana and Turkana 
both migrated south into the Isiolo area, specifically 
near the Ewaso Nyiro River in the early part of the 
20th century, the former from Ethiopia and the latter 
from Turkana in north-west Kenya. The first wave of 
Meru, some of whom had been rendered landless by 
the titling of clan land in Nyambeni Hills came in as 
labourers for the elite of Isiolo town, and later waves 
after independence arrived having been encouraged 
to claim parts of Isiolo as a result of the already sim-
mering boundary dispute (Hjort, 1979).
Colonial records mention intercommunal con-
flicts between the Borana and Samburu. The Kom hot 
spring on the Isiolo-Samburu border was a site of 
conflict even at that time, and there was also conflict 
between the Borana and Somali but less consistent 
(KNA, 1949 p.4). The problem of permanent land for 
 
7 \  The Isaq and Herti were known in colonial records as “alien Somali” 
(as opposed to Somali from Kenya who migrated to the area later.
Isaq and Herti Somali who had begun to encroach 
upon European farms was an ongoing issue (KNA, n.d.), 
leading to the creation of the quarantine area adjacent 
to Isiolo town, which kept cattle of the two groups 
apart. Some incidents of arms smuggling (KNA, 1938; 
1942) and armed poaching (KNA, 1931; 1932; 1937) by 
poachers from Italian Somaliland and Italian admin-
istered Ethiopia were also described during the colo-
nial administration. Later, the Isiolo District Annual 
Report for 1954 states that Isiolo was affected by the 
[Mau Mau] Emergency: 8 Armed groups resisting  
operations in Meru and Laikipia counties made their 
way into Isiolo, or into the northern grazing area of 
Meru. Some Meru in Isiolo were involved in shelter-
ing Mau Mau fighters (KNA, 1954).
Shifta War and massacres
The people of the former Northern Frontier District 
(NFD) have suffered both neglect in terms of service 
provision and heavy-handed control by the colonial 
and post-colonial government which continues to be 
remembered bitterly by elders. During colonial rule, 
the NFD was a “closed district” in part to control inter- 
ethnic conflict (KNA, 1931). 
The District was initially continuous with a larger 
part of Somalia up to the Jubba river, but a portion 
was transferred to Italy by the British after World 
War I as a reward for their support, leaving inhabit-
ants divided from their kin (Menkhaus, 2015). Before 
independence, residents of the district formed a  
Somali Separatist Movement which campaigned to 
join a “Greater Somalia”; while the British considered 
this, the idea was abandoned when the transfer of 
power took place (Whittaker, 2012). Dissatisfaction  
led to the creation of the Northern Frontier District 
Liberation Front (NFDLF) under the leadership of  
Wajir-based Somali, and later a Garissa-based Sultan 
and its campaign which was suppressed by the new 
Kenyan government in the so-called “Shifta War”  
 
 
8 \  A state of emergency was declared in 1952 against the Mau Mau mili-
tant movement which advocated violent resistance to British occupa-
tion. The majority of militants were drawn from the Kikuyu ethnic 
group and had been subject to the administration of ritual oaths. See 
Encyclopaedia Brittanica (n.d.).
History of armed conflict in Isiolo
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(bandit war) which commenced in 1963. The war con-
tributed heavily to the militarisation of Isiolo and the 
rest of the North Eastern Province (NEP) as it became 
known after independence. The NFDLF acquired 
small arms, explosives and land mines from Somalia, 
also training guerrillas in Somalia for use in northern 
Kenya and winning local support (Whittaker, 2012). 
Their main headquarters in Kenya was in Garbatulla 
(KNA, 1965). They attacked administration offices, 
police and army camps as well as collaborators with 
the Kenya government and ambushed police and mil-
itary convoys and patrols. According to the Truth  
Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC, 2013),9  
the state then declared a state of emergency, which 
included curfews, movement restrictions and forced 
villagisation. Villages were cramped and disease- 
ridden and prevented pastoralists from practising 
their pastoral livelihoods. At least 2,000 people and 
probably many more were killed over these four years 
in the NEP (TJRC, 2013 Chapter 4). There were confis-
cations and slaughter of livestock, rapes, extrajudicial 
punishments and killings and other forms of brutality. 
Residents were severely weakened and impoverished 
(Whittaker, 2015). Further, collective punishment was 
administered following the pattern of response by 
the colonial government to the Mau Mau insurgency 
ten years previously; while some non-Somali joined 
the liberation movement, others suffered still from 
the indiscriminate brutality directed towards all the 
inhabitants of the region (Whittaker, 2015).
In 1967, Isiolo District became the centre for a 
Special Operations Committee “to coordinate and  
direct all anti-shifta operations” (KNA, 1967). “Villages” 
or concentration camps in Isiolo were in Merti, Gar-
batulla, Bulla Pesa and Modogashe; here women re-
call daily beatings, rapes and killings of their children. 
A man recalls those who could not move into the 
camps—the weak, sick elderly and young—being shot. 
 
9 \  The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) was created 
by Parliament through the Truth Justice and Reconciliation (TJR) Act 
2008. Its objective was to promote peace, justice, national unity, hea-
ling and reconciliation, among the people of Kenya by: investigating 
and establishing a record of human rights violations by the State since 
Kenya's independence in 1963 to 2008; explaining the causes of the 
violations; and recommending prosecution of perpetrators and repa-
rations for victims.
People now name these events which took place from 
1965 to 1967 as the Daaba Massacre, where Daaba 
means “when everything stopped” (Hussein, 2013).
Following the end of the conflict in 1967, there was 
no disarmament or demobilisation, and some of the 
old arms were used for banditry and cattle rustling 
(Mburu, 1999; Whittaker, 2012). Further, oppressive 
emergency rule continued for three decades during 
which the state was responsible for several horrific 
massacres of inhabitants of the north-east, the worst 
being the Wagalla Massacre in 1984 of an estimated 
2,000, mainly Degodia, pastoralists on an airstrip in 
Wajir (Whittaker, 2015; TJRC, 2013). Emergency rule 
ended in 1992 when the democratic space in Kenya 
was opened by the advent of the multi-party system, 
and the heavy state security presence was withdrawn. 
However, law and order in the north-east was left to 
customary law and tribal or clan militia (Whittaker, 
2015). These events have been blamed for contributing 
to the current poverty of the Borana, and community 
members in Isiolo complained that they are still  
affected by the period of the Shifta War and are still 
viewed as “Shiftas” (bandits).10 
10 \  Focus group discussion with Elders, Kula Mawe, 18 October, 2018.
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Media reports compiled by the ACLED project 
offer an overview of conflicts in the county. ACLED 
records 33 separate incidences of violent conflict in 
Isiolo or involving Isiolo borders in the 10-year period 
preceding the writing of the Report (Raleigh, Linke, 
Hegre & Karlsen, 2010). The search also revealed some 
incidences in Meru and Laikipia counties due to 
cross-border conflict involving pastoralists from Isio-
lo. 189 deaths were reported over this period. The most 
deadly incidences (five or more deaths) are recorded 
in Table 1.
In total, just over half of the total incidences and 
the greatest proportion of the deaths (103) were relat-
ed to pastoral inter-communal conflict (highlighted), 
while a significant number (22) were due to the bor-
der conflict between Isiolo and Meru counties. The 
magnitude of the two types of conflict is evident and 
will be investigated further below. The problem of the 
East Africa-based terrorist organisation, Al Shabaab, 
is also highlighted here, which is particularly active 
in carrying out attacks against civilians and state se-
curity in north-eastern and coastal areas of Kenya.
Current armed conflict in Isiolo County
Table 1   
Most deadly incidences of armed violence in Isiolo or its border areas, November 2008-November 2018. 
Date Type of conflict/ 
violence
Armed groups Ward Location Deaths
September 2008 Cattle raid Unidentified militia Bulla Pesa 5
January 2009 Clashes between pastoralists Somalia and Samburu militia Bulla Pesa/Oldonyiro 15
June 2009 Cattle raid Samburu and Turkana militia Wabera 5
June 2011 Cattle raid 
(on a village)
Samburu militia (attackers) Bulla Pesa 10
January 2012 Attack on civilians 'Bandits' Garbatulla Kaningo 5
November 2014 Clash between pastoralists Turkana and Samburu militia Burat Leruko 8
June 2015 Clash between pastoralists Isiolo herders and Laikipia residents Laikipia county 10
March 2017 Attack on civilians as part of 
pastoralist conflict
Auliyan Somali militia (attackers) Kinna Duse 8
March 2017 Clashes between pastoralists Borana and Samburu militia Chari Kom 10
May 2017 Clashes between pastoralists 
and 300 militia from Samburu/
Rendille
Borana and Samburu/Rendille militia Cherab Barchuma 10
June 2017 Clash between police and over 
70 Samburu raiding militia
Turkana and Samburu militia Burat Mlango 5
July 2017 Border conflict Meru and Isiolo residents Meru county 13
November 2017 Attack on civilians Unknown armed group Cherab 8
November 2018 Clashes between pastoralists Laghdera and Uchana Sericho/ Garbatulla Garissa 
border
5
Source: Own compilation of data based on ACLED (Raleigh et al., 2010) and Abdille (2017). 
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Brockington, 1999; Fratkin, 1997). Peacebuilding pro-
cesses do exist between pastoralist groups but are of-
ten strained in the presence of the new factors noted 
and the involvement of external actors (Mkutu, 2018). 
Isiolo has a relatively better supply of water than 
several of its neighbouring counties and, as a result, 
pastoralists migrate there from Marsabit, Wajir, Gar-
issa, and Samburu counties during the drier seasons, 
which often contributes to conflict (Saferworld, 2015). 
Some negotiation between the usual occupiers and 
incoming pastoralists appears to be the norm. How-
ever, the latter sometimes fail to honour traditional 
systems of the host communities, namely the Borana 
elder-led Dedha system which governs the sustainable 
use of land and water resources among the Borana 
(Mkutu & Boru, 2018).  
One hotspot of intercommunal conflict where  
repeated clashes have occurred is the Kom triangle  
at the Isiolo-Samburu/Marsabit border. In May 2017, 
Borana clashed with Rendille or Samburu herders at 
a time of drought at the Har Kori water pan. Nine 
hundred or more cattle were stolen, and seven people 
were killed (Jebet, 2017). Another area of contention is 
on the Isiolo-Samburu border at a natural spring in 
Kom, where over the years several clashes between 
Borana and Samburu community militias have oc-
curred (KN, 1991;1949). As noted above (Table 1), ten 
people died in a clash in March 2017 when drought 
led them to converge upon the area. On the Isiolo- 
Madogashe road, which proceeds eastwards towards 
the border with Garissa, there is tension between  
Borana and Somali pastoralist communities in various 
places including Kampi Samaki (Garbatulla ward) 
and El Dera (on the Garissa border). Somali pastoral-
ists had not only moved in during dry times from 
Garissa County but had also begun to settle there. The 
issue is not only about pasture and water resources, 
but also about territorial claims; since the road is  
expected to be improved by the World Bank.12  
12 \  Interview, Guyo Haro, Parliamentary Service Commission, Isiolo 
North Constituency office, Isiolo, 20 October 2018.
Inter-communal resource-based  
conflict
Various studies on the Horn of Africa reveal that 
pastoralist conflict is an age-old and perennial phe-
nomenon and is fundamentally related to survival 
amidst harsh climatic conditions and the need to 
move with herds in search of water and pasture, 
which then leads to competition for those resources 
and conflicts over territorial control. Cattle raiding 
itself, which is the predominant form of pastoralist 
conflict is also bound up with the pastoral economy 
and culture, in particular, rites of passage for men 
and the acquisition of livestock to pay the bride price.11 
However, several “new” factors, such as the availabili-
ty of modern firearms from both government sources 
and illicit markets, and markets for cattle meat (in-
cluding black markets) have exacerbated these con-
flicts allowing a situation of commercialised cattle 
raiding to emerge, in which local elites can mobilise 
men for raids or men organise independently to sell 
the cattle for cash (Krätli & Swift, 2003; Hendriksen, 
Mearns, & Armon, 1996). Alongside this, raiding has, 
to some extent, moved out of the control of commu-
nity elders, whose influence has waned in many com-
munities (Lamphear, 1992). Political leaders may also 
become involved in incitement to raids and supply-
ing arms to control territory or resources. Although, 
conversely, politicians sometimes become important 
ambassadors for peace. States have been involved in 
arming communities to protect them from their 
neighbours and disarming communities, often force-
fully. At times this leaves communities unprotected, 
inviting attacks by neighbouring groups and fuelling 
the acquisition of illicit arms for protection (Wepun-
di, Nthiga, Kabuu, Murray, & Alvazzi del Frate, 2012).
Land acquisitions in the name of conservation, 
development and investment, to be discussed in the 
section of that name, have a direct impact on pasto-
ralist conflict as they displace people from pasture, 
mobility routes and water sources and increase com-
petition for available resource (Schlee, 2013; 
11 \  Herskovitz’s work (1926) among the Turkana refers to the “cattle com-
plex” in which cattle are the foundation for cultural life and prestige. 
On bride price as a motivation for raids, see Bollig (1990). On rites of 
passage see Lamphear (1992).
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Kula Mawe in Kinna ward is a Borana-occupied 
area which also has a reputation for cattle raiding  
between all groups. Idafin on the Meru border is 
where Turkana and Samburu pass to raid the Meru 
farmers,13 as noted in “The Samburu see Meru cattle 
rustling as their ATM.” 14 In Kinna, there is also con-
flict over the use of the River Bisanadi whose source 
is in Meru (Mkutu & Boru, 2018). There is inter-com-
munal conflict in Burat ward (see below) and all along 
the Meru border (see Section on boundary conflict  
below), and lastly the border with Laikipia County has 
seen some deadly violence as noted (see Table 1, p. 12).
13 \  Interview, sub-county administrator in Kinna, 16 October 2016.
14 \  Focus group discussion with Isiolo Peace Secretariat,19 October 2018. 
The Peace Secretariat is  a governmental Institution that brings diffe-
rent community tribes together to address peace.
Isiolo Holding Ground and peri-urban conflict
Isiolo Holding Ground (IHG, also known as Live-
stock Marketing Division) is a 124,200ha site adjacent 
to Isiolo town, occupying parts of Burat and Oldonyiro 
wards, and bordering Laikipia, Samburu and Meru 
Counties (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock Develop-
ment and Marketing, 2006). It has historically been 
used as a buffer zone for disease control and an area 
for quarantining and livestock marketing purposes. 
In the present day, it is occupied by a number of users 
including different armed pastoral groups who often 
dispute with one another over pasture and water. 
Ownership is complex and is a “blend of legal govern-
ment ownership and traditional pastoralists’ claims 
Map 2  
Isiolo County showing proposed LAPSSET corridor route
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Burat ward is also a conflict hotspot, being peri-urban 
and multi-ethnic and also part of the contested IHG. 
All pastoral groups and the Meru are armed, and inter- 
communal conflict in the form of cattle raids and 
grazing conflicts is high. 19 In the past, peri-urban 
conflict has also taken a political dimension. Conflict 
in these areas is likely to be exacerbated by the 
planned new developments, which is fuelling land 
acquisition.
Ethno-political conflict
Ethnicity-, politics- and inter-communal resource- 
based or land conflict are very closely related issues. 
As a youth pointed out, “Cattle rustling started long 
ago, alliances and election make the situation worse.” 20 
The migration of pastoralists from other electoral  
divisions has at times been suggested to be voter im-
portation, rather than mobility for the sake of pasture 
or water (UNDP, 2010).
Ethno-political competition has led to severe  
violent armed conflict. From 1996 to 2002, there were 
approximately 1,200 fatalities, and 300,000 animals 
were stolen. Local militias perpetrated unprecedented 
violence, burned villages and targeted women and 
children (Cox, 2015 quotes CEWARN, 2004; Goldsmith, 
1997). There were violent clashes in the lead up to the 
2007 elections due to irregularities in the nomination 
process (KHRC, 2018). In the same elections, the Borana 
hold on power was loosened a little, as Turkana  
candidate Joseph Samal came a close second to the 
Sakuye winner Mohammed Kuti (the Sakuye are eth-
nically close to the Borana). This close call increased 
tensions significantly in the county, leading to an  
escalation of inter-communal violence amidst the 
post-election violence in the country (Ruto, Musoi, 
Tule & Kirui, 2010). The overall conflict situation in 
Isiolo in 2007 and 2008 was recognised as being political 
but expressed in local resource-based (cattle raiding) 
conflicts (Ruto et al., 2010). As Cox (2015, p. 207) notes 
regarding 2007/08, “Political alliances shaped violent 
behavior. Seemingly traditional pastoralist acts of 
raiding cloaked politically motivated violence 
19 \  Interview, an administrator, County Cohesion Department, Isiolo,  
17 October 2018.
20 \  Focus group discussion with youths, Isiolo Holding Ground, Burat, 2018.
of ownership” (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock De-
velopment and Marketing, 2006) given that several 
groups including Ndorobo (Laikipia Maasai), Samburu, 
Turkana, Meru and settled Somali communities were 
displaced when the holding ground was first estab-
lished. Other occupiers of the land include the Kenya 
Wildlife Service and Leparua Conservancy as well as 
the Kenya Defence Force and its affiliates (School of 
Artillery, School of Infantry, School of Combat Engi-
neering, 78th Tank Battalion) and also the British 
Army, police and paramilitary forces (to be men-
tioned). There is some conflict between community 
members and the Kenya Defence Force over the 
School of Infantry in the IHG and over the School of 
Artillery which is claiming land in Ngaremara. Some 
suspect that the army is being used as a proxy for 
well-connected people to acquire land. 15  Ndorobo 
(Laikipia Maasai) pastoralists demanded through the 
National Land Commission that 10,000ha of Leparua 
conservancy within the IHG should be recognised as 
their community land, but this was another source of 
conflict and was halted after protests by other com-
munities, who use the area and use it for grazing.16 
Development assistance, including the building of 
schools and facilities on the IHG has also been pro-
vided to pastoralists by faith-based organisations, and 
there is also some sand harvesting. The holding 
ground continues to be used for quarantining and 
disease screening, as well as fattening and watering, 
but has for some years not been operating as effec-
tively as intended, due to poor management, land 
claims and overgrazing. A new abattoir is currently 
near completion, but as a Ministry of Livestock offi-
cial warned, if not well managed, the improved mar-
ket for livestock could exacerbate cattle raiding for 
cash. 17 
Inter-communal conflict is common on the out-
skirts of Isiolo town. In June to July 2009 in Wabera 
ward, six people died in raids by Turkana and Samburu.18  
15 \  Focus group discussion with Turkana youths Isiolo Holding Ground, 
19 October 2018.
16 \  Interview, an administrator, County Cohesion Department, Isiolo,  
17 October 2018; confirmed by additional interviews in Isiolo in March 
and May 2019; Memorandum by Leparua community to National Land 
Commission, dated 25 April 2018.
17 \  Interview, official from Ministry of Livestock and Agriculture, Isiolo 
town, 9 May 2017.
18 \  ACLED data.
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parliament (Saferworld, 2015; Sharamo, 2014). Cox 
(2015) notes that although violence was expected dur-
ing this election, it did not occur; perhaps because of 
peacebuilding initiatives by the county government 
in partnership with the District Peace Committee. 
The 2017 elections were also mostly peaceful, and 
the governor’s seat was taken by an independent can-
didate of Sakuye ethnicity (who had been senator  
previously) while the senator position was taken by 
the female Borana candidate Dullo Fatuma Adan on a 
Jubilee-allied Party for Development and Reforms 
ticket.21 However, following these elections, there has 
been bad blood between the Samburu and Turkana 
because the Samburu no longer supported the Turka-
na candidate whom they had voted in previously. 22 As 
a consequence, some politicians engaged in arming 
their communities as will be explored (see Section on 
the current state of the arms trade).
County boundary conflict
The Meru–Isiolo County boundary (previously 
the district boundary) is a source of bitter contention, 
both at the political level and the community level 
between Meru farmers and Isiolo-based (Borana)  
pastoralists who bring their animals to graze on dis-
puted areas where crops are grown (Mwitu, 2014). The 
boundary is formally unmarked, but locally known 
and disputed. There is no constitutional requirement 
in place for people to stay within their counties. Dis-
puted areas along the border include Kiwanji, Gambe-
la, Epiding and Kachuru among others and the newly 
constructed airport which is in both counties. This 
conflict has led to several killings, hundreds of dis-
placements and the massive destruction of property, 
as well as livestock theft. As a result of the insecurity, 
the Meru have requested more armed National Police 
Reservists to match the numbers in Isiolo (Mutembei, 
2015).23 Although the dispute is longstanding, it has 
21 \  In the 2017 elections, the main parties were the incumbent Jubilee 
Alliance, a coalition of several smaller parties in 2013 (attracting main-
ly Kikuyu and Kalenjin voters) and the National Super Alliance (NASA) 
coalition formed in 2017 to unite mainly Luo, Luhya and Kamba voters 
under their respective leaders in an attempt to counter Jubilee’s 
strength.
22 \  Interview, official from Parliamentary Service Commission, Isiolo 
North Constituency, 20 October 2018.
23 \  This was supported by many interviews.
designed to undermine Borana power, dominance, 
and territorial control”. Elsewhere, he describes how, 
at this time, arming National Police Reservists and 
disarmament operations were suspected to be politi-
cally motivated. 
Burbidge (2017) notes that violence was particu-
larly intense between 2009 and 2012, with causes in-
cluding political campaigns oriented towards ethnic 
voter bases, land disagreements, cattle rustling, secu-
rity vacuums and small arms. As a result of inter-
group clashes in Isiolo North constituency from 2009 
to 2012, between 165 and 300 people died (Cox, 2015). 
In 2011 to 2012, Turkana villages on the outskirts of 
Isiolo town were frequently targeted by the Borana, in 
a move believed to be spurred by fears of Turkana voter 
strength in the upcoming general elections (Sharamo, 
2014 quotes Huka, 2013; Alternet, 2011). The Borana 
also feared that mobility into Isiolo by Samburu and 
Rendille pastoralists in 2010 was more a case of voter 
importation than a matter of pasture and water (Ruto 
et al., 2010). 
Recent ethnopolitical tensions and 
devolution
Under Kenya’s 2010 Constitution enacted in 2013, 
47 county units were created, each with elected county 
governors and their governments. Several fiscal, judi-
cial and administrative functions were devolved to 
bring government and its services closer to the people. 
In the lead up to the 2013 elections, intense competi-
tion for posts of governor and senator emerged. This 
prompted the candidates to build ethnic alliances be-
tween the main groups (Sharamo, 2014), possibly in-
fluenced by similarities along cultural and religious 
lines (Ruto et al., 2010). The Turkana and Samburu al-
lied together in an attempt to challenge the Borana 
candidate for governorship. The Borana were being 
weakened by inter-clan competition (Abdille, 2017), 
however, a Somali-Borana alliance was able to main-
tain Borana (and Sakuye) dominance (Godana Doyo 
and Mohammed Kuti took governor and senator posi-
tions respectively), while the Turkana candidate fi-
nally got the Isiolo North constituency seat in 
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It was reported, however, that the Meru county 
government is carrying out surveys and adjudication, 
placing beacons and giving title deeds in disputed ar-
eas. Meru county government has now openly created 
a “special” Ngaremara ward, extending from Tigania 
East sub-county of Meru (on the border with Isiolo) 
into parts of Ngaremara ward of Isiolo sub-county, 
where titling and various development projects in-
cluding boreholes are being carried out (Meru County 
Government, 2018) to cement land claims in the area. 
In a bold move by Meru county to stake a claim on 
the area, Shaba conservancy was created (a different 
entity to Shaba National Reserve) and 60-armed rang-
ers have since been stationed there. 29 Job creation 
through the borehole projects and the potential for 
farming, together with the offering of illegal title 
deeds by the Meru county government (contrary to 
its remit and the court ruling above) is influencing 
some (mainly Turkana) residents and local leaders to 
support the actions of Meru county. 30 This is leading 
to tensions between these beneficiaries and other 
Turkana residents who have lost community land. 31 
There is also some evidence of acquisition of title 
deeds by private individuals. 32
Borana elders talking about the road construc-
tion in the area by the World Bank, voiced their anger 
and fear,
The road being made is Meru, the Borana are not 
known by the Meru; the Meru now claim up to Gotu, 
Ngaremara is their own. They think they will just 
take. Borana, we are in trouble… The Meru have wok-
en up because of the road; all the jobs, benefits will go 
to the Meru…They want to snatch our land; blood 
will be poured if they want to take our resources. 33
Further, it was noted that the “tyranny of the ma-
jority” is in operation in Meru County, which has a 
higher population of voters and therefore more clout 
with the ruling party which would desire to please 
them when it comes to disputes over land in 
29 \  Interview, an administrator for civic education, County Cohesion  
Department, Isiolo, 17 October 2018.
30 \  Interview, peace actor, Isiolo town, 20 October 2018.
31 \  Focus group discussion with elders in Isiolo, 17 September 2018.
32 \  See footnote 31.
33 \  Focus group discussion with elders in Kula Mawe, 19 October 2018.
been exacerbated by the planned developments 
(LAPSSET and related projects) which lie in the dis-
puted areas, leading to land claims by all of the main 
communities, and even the county governments, as 
they hope to benefit from compensation (Mutembei, 
2015). 
Meru representatives have consistently appealed 
to honour the colonial boundary demarcation which 
originated in 1924, but their Isiolo counterparts argue 
that this itself was erroneously marked and that Isio-
lo district was left out of the deliberations of the 
Boundary Commission in 1962 because of the Shifta 
War. 24 In 2015, the Ministry of the Interior created a 
task force for surveying and demarcating boundaries. 
However, a petition by Isiolo county government and 
others stated that it was unrepresentative, tribal and 
also not the mandate of the Ministry of the Interior 
who convened it. 25 The dispute has been exacerbated 
by devolution which has raised the stakes for the po-
litical control of land and key installations, in par-
ticular, the planned large-scale developments and the 
recently built international airport. 26 
The 2013 Nanyuki Accord attended by elected 
leaders and community leaders of Isiolo and Meru 
counties sought to calm tensions arising from the 
historical boundary demarcations. 27 It was agreed 
inter alia that the dispute would be resolved through 
institutional mechanisms and that activities taking 
place would be stopped until the disputes had been 
resolved. 28 However, agreements were broken, and 
conflict continued. In June 2017, Isiolo county won a 
significant victory when High Court Justice Lenaola 
ruled that an independent commission be set up to 
resolve the dispute and that the status quo should  
remain in the interim (Abdi, 2018).
24 \  Constitutional Petition No. 551 of 2015 County Government of Isiolo & 
ten others v Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of the Interior and Coordination 
of National Government & 3 others [2017] eKLR http://kenyalaw.org/
caselaw/cases/view/137183/ Accessed 14 November 2018.
25 \  See footnote 24.
26 \  See footnote 24.
27 \  See footnote 24.
28 \  Resolutions of the Meru/Isiolo leaders’ meeting held at Sportsman 
Arms Hotel, Nanyuki, 20 December 2013.
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rights of community land rights-holders as being 
equivalent to those of private landowners. The Com-
munity Land Act makes provisions for group registra-
tion of communally owned land and compensation 
directly to the registered group. However, registration 
is complex, public sensitisation on the Act has been 
weak, and most community land has not been regis-
tered. As development projects move ahead, the land 
rights of indigenous communities have been entrusted 
to county governments to make agreements and to 
receive compensation on their behalf, a far less secure 
arrangement which is prone to corruption. Further, 
most communities are not even aware that there are 
legal provisions to protect them. 
The main development project affecting land 
rights in the area is the (planned) Lamu Port South 
Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor. Accord-
ing to LAPSSET Development Authority (2017), the 
corridor is planned to pass through Garbatulla and 
Kinna wards in Isiolo County, then through nine 
wards of Meru County, then back into the pan handle 
of Isiolo County through Wabera, Burat and Oldonyiro 
wards. A resort city has been planned for the Kipsing 
Gap (to the west of Isiolo town and part of the Isiolo 
Holding Ground). However, following an environ-
mental impact assessment, there are suggestions that 
this may change (Abdi, 2017). Communities, and even 
administrators, are not in the loop on information 
about where the LAPSSET will pass; a county official 
noted that the LAPSSET issues go through the county 
commissioner’s office (the national government rep-
resentative) and leave out the county government. 37 
Participation has been poor, with public meetings 
held in Isiolo town, which is inaccessible for most. 38 
This situation is leading to fear and suspicion, par-
ticularly relating to the allocation of some title deeds 
to elites, and adjudication by Meru County in disput-
ed areas, considering that Isiolo land is largely com-
munity land.
37 \  Interview, sub-county administrator, Kinna, 16 October 2018.
38 \  Interview, officer in the County Cohesion Department, Isiolo, 17 October 
2018; concurred by sub-county administrator for Kinna, 16 October 
2018.
preparation for the 2022 election. 34 Finally, with regard 
to the Meru-Isiolo border, the national parliament is 
currently in debate over the suggestion that the num-
ber of counties is reduced, resulting possibly in the 
merging of the two counties. This move would be 
likely to see strong resistance by Isiolo and other 
northern counties who fear that they might be mar-
ginalised again in terms of development (Daily Nation, 
2018). 35 Some Borana elders, feeling that their liveli-
hoods would not be respected, said that in the event 
of such a merger with Meru they would move into 
Ethiopia. 36 The conflict demonstrates the intercom-
munal and political layers of conflict, complicated by 
self-interests of leaders.
There is also a boundary dispute between Isiolo 
and Garissa County governments concerning an area 
near Modogashe on the Isiolo-Garissa border. This 
has contributed to severe inter-communal conflict 
over pasture and water in 2019 between Somali pasto-
ralists from Garissa County and Borana from Isiolo 
(Jebet, 2019). Conflict on this border is also exacerbated 
by the discovery of oil, announced in 2013 (Menkhaus, 
2015; Salesa, 2013). Further exploration has currently 
stalled due to a legal battle between the company and 
the Kenyan government (Business Daily, 2014). This 
discovery has the potential to cause inter-communal/
ethnopolitical conflicts over jobs and benefits which 
may ensue. 
Land tenure, development and conflict
Development projects cause conflict in several 
ways. Given the nature of land tenure in Isiolo, which 
is largely community land held in trust by counties, it 
is relatively easy for the rights of communities, as op-
posed to private landowners, to be disregarded 
through displacement with inadequate or slow com-
pensatory mechanisms. The intention of the Commu-
nity Land Act (2016) is to make this more difficult, as 
it follows the Land Act (2012), which recognises the 
 
34 \  Interview, official from the Parliamentary Service Commission, Isiolo 
North Constituency, 20 October 2018.
35 \  Concurred in an interview, sub-county administrator in Kinna, 
16 October 2018.
36 \  Focus group discussion with elders in Kula Mawe, 19 October 2018.
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triggering Somali pastoralists from Garissa County to 
create bomas (homesteads) and dig boreholes along 
the Isiolo–Madogashe road which traverses Garbatulla 
sub-county. 41 However, this belief does not correspond 
with the law on the transformation of community 
land for other purposes. In a focus group discussion, 
participants reported: “The Somalis have moved to 
the main road claiming it’s their land. They have 
built schools, [their] chiefs are employed, it is a distri-
bution point for relief food. Isiolo people are against 
it…people claiming the rangeland.” 42 A similar dynamic 
is happening further west along the road as it cuts 
through Meru county, triggered again by the planned 
LAPSSET development, anticipating looming dis-
placement, lack of compensation, and a rise in the 
value of the land. Therefore, development has created 
a new kind of pastoral conflict over rights to settle-
ment for the sake of compensation, as opposed to  
access to pasture and water.
Extensive land speculation has taken place along 
the LAPSSET route and the Kipsing Gap site, which 
has increased land disputes and resource conflict 43 
and is connected to inter-county boundary dispute as 
noted previously. A review of court records and inter-
views with Isiolo court officials revealed that immi-
gration due to the planned economic growth has led 
to an increased number of court cases involving land 
disputes. 44 The case of Isiolo International Airport 
continues to be a source of bitter contention, following 
the slow and disorderly compensation/relocation of 
those who were displaced, the confusion brought by 
the transition from the former administrative struc-
tures to the County government in 2013 and the cor-
rupt acquisition of land by elites (Mkutu, Otieno,  
Gioto, Wandera, Kajumbi and Palmreuther, 2017).  
Displaced Meru, however, were more easily compen-
sated given that the area is titled on the Meru side.
41 \  Focus group discussion with elders in Kula Mawe, 19 October 2018.
42 \  Focus group discussion with elders in Kula Mawe, 19 October 2018.
43 \  Focus group discussion with Turkana youths in Isiolo Holding 
Ground, Burat, 17 September 2018; this was also acknowleged in an  
interview from the Somalia side of the holding ground with a Somali 
youth, Burat, 17 September 2018.
44 \  Environmental and Land Court Isiolo register 2016-2018 and inter-
view with court official, Isiolo, 19 September 2018; the Court was set  
up in 2016 and was frozen by a moratorium on all land cases in the 
country during part of 2016 and 2017.
An administrator voiced the various concerns of 
people regarding the LAPSSET developments in a 
comment which illustrates how fears of displace-
ment and exclusion are joined by a myriad of other 
potential grievances which may precipitate commu-
nity-investor conflict. 
People do not have title deeds; people are worried as 
there will be no compensation. People fear that they 
will be displaced and that locals will be a minority as 
an influx of people come in. We will lose our lifestyle; 
our culture will be affected. We hear that a five-star 
hotel will be constructed, [we fear] bad sexual diseases. 
So many things; people are living in fear. The aware-
ness has not reached the grassroots. 39
When communities are displaced as a result of 
investment or development, this may lead to direct 
protests and even violent action against the investor, 
or as noted, increased competition and conflict be-
tween pastoralist groups over shrinking rangeland 
and water sources. It may even more often lead to a 
general increase in crime and violence in developed 
areas as a result of grievances, new targets for theft, 
harmful social changes and loss of viable alternative 
occupations (Peters, 2013; Bourguignon, 2000; Ikelegbe, 
2005; Mkutu, 2017). An official predicted similar out-
comes for Isiolo, “the pastoralists are losing vast 
[amounts of ] land and are not being prepared for  
alternative livelihoods. They will resort to other 
measures for survival, and they will frustrate the 
so-called development projects”. 40 Such projects are  
attractive targets for various armed groups to air 
their grievances against either the Kenyan state or 
the investor. One example of this is the attack of a 
Chinese road construction site by eight militants in 
neighbouring Garissa County in which four people 
were injured before the militants fled. The police and 
Kenya Defence Force soldiers had been warned of this 
attack and defended the site (Kunow, 2018).
Conflicts are also triggered by rumour and specu-
lation at the local level. Elders in Kula Mawe, Kinna 
ward, believed that communities could only be com-
pensated if they were settled, while the same belief is  
 
39 \  Interview, local administrator in Burat, 19 October 2018.
40 \  Interview,  officer in the County Cohesion Department, Isiolo,  
17 October 2018.
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A number of specific cases of elite land acquisi-
tion have seen locals shaking their heads, perplexed 
by the ease with which their land can be taken; in 
Wabera ward, an official mentioned the case of 
around 45 households, a primary school and prisons 
on a site which is being claimed by a wealthy busi-
nessman from outside the county. 45 It is said that 
in Gambela (Ngaremara ward), an area disputed  
between Isiolo and Meru Counties, a wealthy Somali 
investor has been able to acquire 78 acres of land for 
irrigation farming. 46 
45 \  Interview, Yusuf Huka, Coordinator Civic Education, County Cohesion 
Department, Isiolo, 17 October 2018.
46 \  Focus group discussion, elders in Kula Mawe, 19 October 2018.
Table 2   
Planned large-scale development projects in Isiolo and their conflict-related impacts
Development project Impacts and conflict risks
Highways: 
Lamu-Garissa -Isiolo road (530 km in progress)
Isiolo-Maralal road (156 km not yet started)
Isiolo-Moyale road (470 km)
Isiolo-Wajir-Mandera road (700 km not yet started)
Improved access and service delivery 
Boost to the local and national economy
Land-use changes and immigration 
Isiolo International Airport Increased tourism revenue and boost to the local economy
Conflict due to displacement, irregular compensation and land allocations
Isiolo/Meru boundary conflict
Railways: 
Lamu - Nakodok (Turkana) through Isiolo,
Isiolo - Moyale (not yet started)
Conflicts due to displacement and land speculation, 
especially Isiolo/Meru boundary conflict
Pipelines Conflicts due to displacement and land speculation, 
especially Isiolo/Meru boundary conflict
Isiolo dams (Crocodile Jaw and Ngarendare)  
(13,000 hectares in project preparation phase)
Anticipated reduction of downstream water by 62 per cent
New agricultural projects upstream 
Pastoralist displacement likely
Increased intercommunal, community vs. investor 
and community vs. state security conflicts.
Resort City (6500 hectares) May be moved, possibly out of the county 
Boost to the local and national economy through tourism and investment
Land conflict due to speculation and politics
Isiolo/Meru boundary conflict
Oil refinery Planned for Isiolo sub-county, may be moved 
(GOK Ministry of Energy and Petroleum, 2016)
Pastoralist displacement and risk of land conflict
Finally, an elder, discussing the marginalisation 
of Isiolo (especially Borana) pastoralists compared to 
settled people, spoke ominously of the severe conflict 
which might arise: 
They got an education, but the government did not 
care about us. We were marginalised and we did not 
get what other Kenyans got. In terms of education, 
we are behind. The people to benefit are educated….
where LAPSSET passes we do not know. Our neigh-
bours are pushing us so that they can get compensation.
Source: Adapted from Mkutu & Boru, 2018.
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conservancy security functions—a controversial  
issue that will be discussed in the Section on armed 
groups.
By reinforcing land claims and restricting access 
to certain areas, conservancies may sometimes lead 
to conflict with pastoralist groups outside of the con-
servancies (Greiner, 2013), despite the fact that they 
have peacebuilding functions, too, particularly be-
tween different ethnic groups within the same con-
servancy. 51 Some respondents in Isiolo expressed the 
view that conservancy management structures are 
dominated by the Samburu (Waso Professional Group, 
2019); this is the case partly because conservancies 
arrived much earlier in Samburu and Laikipia Coun-
ties, 52 and 95 per cent of Samburu County land is now 
under conservancy management (Pas Schrijver, 2019). 
Also, many residents in Isiolo feel that the arming of 
conservancy rangers in neighbouring Samburu County 
has been to the detriment of Borana pastoralists in 
Isiolo County. 53 A report by a group of Borana profes-
sionals concurs that since the formation of Biliqo- 
Bulesa conservancy in 2007, 63 people from the Borana 
community have been killed in nine raids by the 
Samburu who had been well resourced by NRT (Waso 
Professional Group, 2019, p. 7) (see Section on armed 
groups below).  
There have been occasions when communities 
have conflicted with NRT, perceiving that their land 
is being taken, or decisions are being made without 
consultation. In 2018, the community in Biliqo Bulesa 
conservancy was divided when some asked NRT to 
leave as they were worried about losing control over 
their rangeland whose use is carefully planned. They 
were also concerned that a proposed lodge would dis-
place them from the Kuro Bissan Owwo hot springs 
in the area which are famed for their medicinal value.54 
By May 2019, the divisions between pro- and anti-NRT 
positions had reached the wider Isiolo society, with 
demonstrations of supporters and opponents of NRT 
 
 
51 \  Interview, Josephine Nkiru, NRT, Isiolo, 17 August 2018.
52 \  More research is needed here to verify this allegation in view of its 
sensitivity.
53 \  Interviews in Isiolo in March and May 2019.
54 \  Phone correspondence and phone interview, local administrator,  
15 November 2018.
For us to get the benefits of LAPSSET, it’s going to 
be blood. 47
Judging by Isiolo’s history of deadly conflict and 
the several layers of conflict evident in this scenario, 
these comments deserve careful consideration.
Table 2 summarises current information on mega- 
projects expected in Isiolo and the potential impacts 
and conflict risks, which one administrator likened 
to “a bad tsunami”. 48 
Conflict surrounding conservation areas
Conservation areas are an important issue in 
land-use conflicts. There are three national reserves 49 
in Isiolo (Bisanadi, Shaba and Buffalo Springs) in 
well-watered areas, and the county borders Meru  
National Park. There is conflict between communities 
and Kenya Wildlife Service Officers over the en-
croachment of community members into the park 
and into Buffalo Springs for grazing during the  
frequent droughts. This has led to some violent 
deaths (see Section on armed groups).
Conservancies are another type of conservation 
area,  and an increasing phenomenon in Kenya’s 
northern counties. They are areas of land set aside for 
conservation purposes, ecotourism, collective range-
land management and other livelihood-related func-
tions. They may be privately or government-owned,  
or (increasingly) run by a board of community repre-
sentatives. There are five conservancies in Isiolo, all of 
which are community conservancies: Biliqo-Bulesa, 
Oldonyiro, Leparua, Nasuulu and Nakuprat Gotu 50 
and under the umbrella of the Northern Rangelands 
Trust (NRT). NRT is a non-governmental organisation 
which helps to establish and support conservancies, 
and assists in several functions including the train-
ing and resourcing of security guards. Locally recruited 
armed National Police Reservists may be allocated to 
conservancies to safeguard wildlife and for other 
 
47 \  Focus group discussion, elders in Kula Mawe, 19 October 2018.
48 \  Interview, peace worker, Ngaremara, 9 May 2017.
49 \  In parks, natural resources are fully protected, and the only activities 
allowed are tourism and research. In reserves, on the other hand, hu-
man activities are allowed under specific conditions. http://www.kws.
go.ke/content/overview-0; Accessed 23 November, 2018.
50 \  Interview, County Secretary for Tourism, Isiolo town, May 10, 2017.
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operations taking place in Isiolo town in April and 
early May, and Isiolo politicians openly criticising 
NRT (Muchui, 2019; NFD Dispatch, 2019).
In summary, the presence of conservancies in Isi-
olo may lead to conflict as they exclude certain 
groups from accessing land (and water) within that 
conservancy and reinforce and cement what were 
previously more fluid land claims over portions of 
community land. By having a well-trained security 
team, there may be an increased potential for ethnic 
conflict between armed conservancy scouts and com-
munity militias on the outside of conservancies, or 
with scouts from other conservancies. However, con-
servancies may also contribute to peace by providing 
a wider range of livelihood activities thus reducing 
the reliance upon livestock-keeping and consequent-
ly potentially reducing competition and conflict over 
scarce resources. Conservancies also provide a plat-
form for shared decision-making between communi-
ties within the conservancy area and also with those 
from other conservancies.
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Sometimes, they are supported by politicians who, 
for instance, provide them with small arms and am-
munition. Kalyvas (2006, p. 107) notes that militia are 
part of local rule and state-building and that amongst 
pastoralists they are “a key tool for enforcing occupa-
tion”. Table 3 shows the armed groups present in Isiolo.
State-armed groups
POLICE
In 2011, the National Police Service was formed 
from the Kenya Police (KP) and the Administration 
Police (AP) as a result of the restructuring of Kenya’s 
security forces. Both services have separate histories. 
Under colonial rule, the KP had been assigned to areas 
settled by the British, while the AP were more informal 
and responsible for the “native reserves” (Mkutu & 
Wandera, 2013). The AP was professionalised as time 
went on but remained separate from the KP until 
constitutional reforms merged the two services under 
a single Inspector General of Police while keeping 
their functions separate (Waller, 2010). According to 
the National Police Service Act (2011) both have roles 
in law and order, preservation of peace, protection of 
life and property and the apprehension of offenders, 
but the regular police are responsible for criminal 
investigation, while the AP are responsible for border 
control, the protection of strategic installations and 
managing stock-theft.
Armed groups
It is difficult to classify the armed groups currently 
active in Isiolo County because people may act in more 
than one capacity and use their weapons for more 
than one purpose. National Police Reservists (NPR) 
are known for using their arms in banditry and cattle 
raiding as are community armed militias (Mkutu & 
Wandera, 2013). In newspaper reports, criminal activ-
ities are often said to be perpetrated by bandits, but 
these are not usually a distinct group of their own. 
One interviewee called armed actors “herders by day 
and bandits by night”. 55 The term bandit or shifta has 
conveniently been used to describe irredentist insur-
gents in the past, so it is a vague and loaded term. As a 
further indication of the fluidity of terms, ‘poachers’ are 
often community members, but sometimes separate 
groups and even police reservists who are known to 
use their arms to steal cattle. Cattle raiding and other 
inter-communal violence may be conceived of as crim-
inal acts, but these are also age-old cultural practices, 
legitimised by communities and tolerated by law 
enforcers. 
The term ‘militia’ is used here to describe local 
community fighters who are mainly herders, but who 
are also responsible for community security (they may 
also be referred to as herders, warriors or morans). 
They are also known to mobilise in groups to raid 
other ethnic groups.
55 \  Interview with a senior sub-county administrator, Kinna. 16 October 2018.
Main formations of organised violence
Table 3   
Armed groups in Isiolo
State armed group Para-state armed group Community 
armed militias
Insurgents and 
terrorist groups
Criminal groups
NATIONA POLICE SERVICE
Police
Administration Police
General Service Unit
Anti-Stock-Theft Unit
Anti-Terrorism Police Unit 
Rapid Deployment Unit 
Camel Patrol
Military (training camps)
Rangers in national parks 
(Kenyia Wildlife Service)
NATIONAL POLICE RESERVISTS 
Community-based 
Conservancy Rangers (NPR)
Conservancy Rapid 
Response Militias
Conservancy Rangers
(non NPR)
Pastoral community 
security groups
Oromo Liberation 
Front
Al Shabaab
Bandits
Poachers
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A local administrator noted: 
Rapid response is critical, but this does not occur. 
Even intelligence by the state is very slow. People 
wonder why there is no rapid response. There is no 
trust in government; small arms are their security 
and [community members] help each other. Neigh-
bours have guns, how do you disarm? In my location, 
we have only one NPR and the place is a hotspot 
with 300 households…So we need [sufficient] NPR. 57
This statement is indicative of the problem of  
inadequate state security presence in Isiolo and its 
relationship to the presence of community militia. 
The restructuring of the NPS has exacerbated this 
problem.
The General Service Unit (GSU) is a special police 
unit established as a sub-unit of the Kenya Police  
Service (Section 24 of the National Police Service Act, 
2011) whose mandate includes, amongst others, the 
provision of security to strategic points and vital  
installations and containing of banditry and cattle  
rustling (Kenya Police Service, n.d.). In Isiolo, the unit 
has been involved in several cattle recovery operations 
to back up regular police. For example, in July 2018, 
they were part of the operation to recover stolen live-
stock in Ngaramare, noted in the introduction (K24 TV, 
2018).The GSU have been accused on occasion of using 
excessive force; examples include the one mentioned 
early in the Paper in Ngaremara and an incident in 
2018, when the force was on duty during a rally by 
President Uhuru Kenyatta in Isiolo, and one officer 
fatally shot a young man who, according to media  
reports, was unarmed (Kenyans.co.ke, 2018).
The Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) is a new unit 
and a subset of the GSU (above). An office was placed 
in Isiolo in 2016 to respond to problems of radicalisa-
tion and recruitment into Al Shabaab. The unit has 
been accused of taking a heavy-handed and indis-
criminate approach and making enemies of commu-
nities, thereby hindering the gathering of intelli-
gence. 58 This echoes the findings of Human Rights 
Watch (2016) which implicated the Kenya Defence 
Force and the ATPU in the disappearances of 34 people 
between 2014 and 2016.
57 \  Interview, administrator in a remote location, 18 October, 2018.
58 \  Interview county administrator, Isiolo town, 7 May, 2017.
Police posts are thin on the ground in Isiolo, and 
the relationship between the police and communities 
is poor (Mkutu et al., 2017). This is in part still a legacy 
from the Shifta War days, but it is also a response to 
the lack of capacity of the police, who do not leave 
main roads and are unable to recover stolen cattle or 
respond quickly to cattle raids. It was noted that the 
police do not usually move at night, and that cattle 
raiders take advantage of this knowledge. In Kinna 
ward, the state of the Administration Police was poor, 
both in terms of personnel and housing. The duty  
station consisted of tin shacks, exposing the eight  
officers to the sweltering heat. They were rotating in 
shifts to manage a conflict hotspot (Mkutu & Boru, 
2018). A beaten-up Land Rover which could no longer 
move was serving as a temporary holding cell. These 
officers are vulnerable; in Ngaremara in 2018 as noted, 
Turkana community members overpowered and 
killed an officer who they believed had sided with the 
government against them (when the latter mounted 
an operation to remove livestock allegedly stolen 
from the Samburu).
People remarked that the Administration Police 
were more in touch with what happened on the 
ground since they had historically been based in 
communities. However, since 2010, under the new 
Constitution of Kenya, this force has no longer been 
under the command of the provincial administration, 
and chiefs have been unable to mobilise officers 
when they saw fit. While the previous system had 
the potential for abuse (and indeed has been grossly 
abused in many instances such as regime protection 
and corruption and partisanship) (Government of 
Kenya, 1992; Ghai & McAuslan, 1970), it did allow for a 
more rapid response by those who were on the 
ground. Chiefs in Isiolo complained, “we had guns, 
but three years ago they were taken away. With guns 
and National Police Reservists (NPR,) we could push 
back cattle raiders, but now we cannot”. 56 In general, 
the community members voiced that they would 
rather have armed NPR to protect them (see Section 
on para-state armed groups below). 
56 \  Focus group discussion with chiefs from Isiolo town, 8 May 2017.
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by KWS guards. 62 The situation became so severe that  
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights  
(KNCHR) was involved in mediating a peace meeting 
in 2016 in which KWS apologised and paid three mil-
lion Kenya shillings (US $30,000) to the community 
as compensation. 63 
In summary, several different police units oper-
ate in Isiolo under the National Police Service. These 
are quite thin on the ground and have somewhat 
overlapping roles, with the Kenya Police being more 
urban-based than the Administration Police. The GSU 
and ASTU reinforce the police in specific roles, and 
the ATPU have their own specific role in counter-ter-
rorism. These are entirely separate from the KWS 
rangers in national parks and rangers in national 
reserves. 
Para-state armed groups
NATIONAL POLICE RESERVE (NPR)
National Police Reservists (NPR) 64 are community 
members, armed by the Kenyan state to supplement 
the police in the provision of security. The force was 
established as the Kenya Police Reserve (KPR) in 1948 
to protect settlers’ interests and supported the National 
Police in the suppression of the Mau Mau rebellion 
(Clayton & Killingray, 1989). In recent decades, NPR 
have been a volunteer force recruited from amongst 
rural (mainly pastoral) communities and armed to 
protect the livestock of that same community while 
in camps or on the move. They are well acquainted 
with the areas in which they operate and used to  
the challenges of terrain and climate; thus, they can 
rapidly respond to danger in the interests of protecting 
their cattle wealth. By the nature of their location—
often on international border areas—they inadvertently 
also provide cross-border security and also often  
operate in rural towns, doing the work of the police.
62 \  Focus group discussion with peace committee members, Kinna, 9 May 
2017; FGD with county ward administrators, Isiolo town, 9 May 2017.
63 \  Focus group discussion with county ward administrators,  held in 
Isiolo town, 9 May 2017.
64 \  This section draws on Mkutu & Wandera, 2013 unless otherwise 
specified.
The Anti-Stock Theft Unit (ASTU) was established to 
support the Kenya Police Service in accordance with 
Section 24 of the 2011 National Police Service Act in 
anti-stock theft operations, stock–theft investigations, 
preventive work on stock-theft and crowd control  
using horses (Kenya Police Service, n.d.). The ASTU  
is stationed every eight km along the Isiolo–Meru 
border but not in other hotspots of Isiolo. 59 Some 
have commented that ASTU’s deployment is politi-
cised and/or commercialised. Others say that it is lax 
and unresponsive to the needs of communities being 
raided (Waithaka, 2018; Daily Nation, 1999).
The Camel Patrol60  was set up in August 2018, to 
patrol the Kenya–Somali border and insecure parts of 
the north and are currently being trained in Isiolo. 
This will assist police who are vulnerable to attacks 
on their cars, to take previously inaccessible routes 
(Ombati, 2018b).
RANGERS IN NATIONAL PARKS AND RESERVES
Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) rangers guard Meru 
National Park, while Shaba, Buffalo Springs and Bisinadi 
reserves (in the north of Isiolo sub-county) are run by 
the county that employs its own 68 rangers, some of 
whom are armed. Positions to increase the number to 
128 have been advertised, but these new rangers do 
not carry arms, because rangers are supposed to be 
removed in the restructuring of the police service  
(although some may later become armed NPR). 61
To curb poaching, parks and wildlife reserves 
since 2013 do not permit grazing by communities 
(Ringa, 2013). Unfortunately, these parts contain some 
of the best water and pasture. There have been violent 
confrontations between communities and Kenya 
Wildlife Service guards when the former have entered 
against orders with their livestock, or have been  
accused of poaching. One person was killed by wild-
life rangers and several injured in Kinna ward in 2016, 
and up to eleven others have allegedly been abducted  
 
 
59 \  Interview, county official, Isiolo town, 19 October, 2018.
60 \  At the time of wiriting, the unit had not been operational.
61 \  Phone interview, senior national government administrator based in 
Isiolo, 12 January 2019.
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and the County Commissioner for Isiolo has stated  
that they are now being paid 5,000 KSh (US $50) per 
month to defend their communities, 67  although  
reservists noted that this only comes every three to 
four months.68   At the same time, community mem-
bers who came forward to register their arms were 
also being prioritised in the move to recruit 500 new 
NPR in the county.69  Some community members are 
afraid to come forward as they believe that this may 
be a ploy to disarm them, leaving them vulnerable. 70  
In 2019, Isiolo disarmed many NPR in an attempt to 
vet personnel and track arms, following a decision by 
the national government. 71  At the time of writing, 
Meru County was demanding more NPR personnel 
following a week of conflict on the Isiolo–Meru border 
area between miraa (khat) farmers and pastoralists 
from neighbouring counties. in which six people had 
died (Wanyoro, 2019).
CONSERVANCY NPR
Within conservancies, there are rangers (also 
known as scouts) many of whom are NPR, which  
allows them to carry a government-issued weapon. 
Yet, somewhat confusingly, some conservancy rangers 
who are not NPR are also armed (see above). In recent 
years, the Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT) who  
provides uniforms, vehicles and tracking devices and 
other support has been resourcing and supervising 
most of these conservancy NPR. Some NPR rangers 
have been organised by NRT into rapid response 
teams known as “9-1, 9-2…” teams, whose members 
receive special tactical training (NRT, 2017, p. 42) 72 by 
British ex-army personnel (Mkutu & Wandera, 2013) 
and private security personnel with family links to 
Kenyan elites within the conservancy movement. 73  
Despite efforts to make the teams multi-ethnic, 
some Borana community members perceived that 
they were dominated by Samburu. 74  Another source 
67 \  Interview George Natembeya, County Commissioner, 9 May 2017.
68 \  Interview, National Police Reservist, Gotu, Isiolo 7 May 2019.
69 \  Interview George Natembeya, County Commissioner, 9 May 2017.
70 \  Group interview, chief and assistant chief in Duse, 19 November 2018.
71 \  Peace worker and researcher, email communication 13 June 2019.
72 \  Interview, conservancy staff member in Laikipia County, 19 June 2019.
73 \  Interview senior county administrator Isiolo Isiolo, 17 October 2018.
74 \  Several interviews conducted with civil society, individuals and 
faith-based organisations noted this fact; interviews August and 
October 2018. But also during interviews in April 2017, this was noted.
Until recently, NPR were not paid and had incon-
sistent and highly inadequate arrangements for 
training, supervision and monitoring of firearms. 
Training may be limited to a few weeks or even days, 
and it was noted in Isiolo as elsewhere, that bribing 
the authorities was one way to acquire a gun. 65 Some-
times, recruitment is subject to political interference 
as politicians request their own community members 
to be armed. 66  This calls into question the selection 
of recruits which should be transparent and repre-
sentative. Owing to the NPR’s mobile livelihoods, the 
police only track their arms on an irregular basis. 
NPR have until recently also lacked IDs and uniforms 
and were commonly dressed in traditional attire and 
thus identifiable only by their government-issued 
guns. They have referred to themselves as Askari ya 
Deni (“security on credit”) and joked that KPR stands 
for Kufa Pamoja na Raia (“die together with the citizens”) 
(Mkutu & Wandera, 2013). Such conditions have hardly 
fostered a sense of professionalism. 
The NPR are notorious for using their arms for 
other income-generating activities, including private 
security work and road escorts, and this is unofficially 
tolerated because of the acknowledgement that they 
are often unpaid. Sometimes they are created, de-
ployed and paid to protect the private interests of 
elites and politicians, while more obviously illicit  
activities may include cattle theft, banditry and ter-
rorising those who have no escorts into using their 
services—thereby operating as a kind of protection 
racket. In neighbouring Laikipia County, the admin-
istrators accused the NPR of colluding with the cattle 
rustlers (Eastern Post Magazine, 2018). 
In its attempts to deal with rural insecurity, the 
Kenyan state at various points in time have both cre-
ated and disarmed the NPR. In recent years, however, 
it has made moves towards professionalising the 
force in view of their apparently crucial albeit cor-
ruptible role. Several counties are now paying NPRs 
 
 
 
65 \  Interview, official, name withheld, October 2018; this finding has 
been replicated another studyin Kenya’s northern counties, where 
prospective NPR may pay up to 30,000 to get a gun (Aridi, 2013).
66 \  Interview George Natembeya, County Commissioner, 9 May 2017.
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servancy created by Meru County in which there are 
60 armed rangers.79 
The arming of rangers in conservancies poses 
several potential and real challenges. First, as noted, 
although care has been taken to ensure ethnic bal-
ance within rapid response teams, other ranger 
teams are not necessarily ethnically mixed, since not 
all conservancies are. In the past, there have been in-
stances of ethnicised conflict involving conservancy 
ranger teams. Following a drought in the first half of 
2013, Kom, the site of a natural spring on the border of 
Biliqo-Bulesa conservancy in Chari ward and Sera 
conservancy in Samburu County, became the site of 
conflict between the Samburu, Isiolo Borana and also 
herders from Marsabit County, in which ten people 
were killed. A conservancy staff member commented: 
“In Kom, rangers were used. Each ranger decided to 
join his own community so that it was conservancies 
fighting instead of communities fighting”. 80  As noted 
previously, an elder concurred that since the forma-
tion of Biliqo-Bulesa conservancy (in 2007), 63 people 
from the Borana community have been killed in nine 
raids by the Samburu who had been well resourced by 
NRT (Waso Professional Group, 2019, p. 7). 
Second, managing security in vast conservancy 
spaces has been a matter which the Kenyan state has 
been happy to cede to the conservancy management 
teams and NRT. Kenyan elites, who naturally also 
pursue their private interests in land, resources and 
security, have mainly been the leaders of such teams. 
There is a partnership with the state through KWS 
training, but very little direct police supervision of 
NPR and their arms in conservancies, and conservancy 
security forces are superior in terms of resources and 
even training. 
Third, and related to this, conservancies rely to a 
significant extent upon outside donor support which 
in part derives from foreign taxpayers, to pay and pro-
vide resources to NPR, which may not be sustainable 
or ethical, given that they are armed security actors. 
 
 
 
79 \  Interview, administrator within the Department of Tourism , Isiolo, 
18 October 2018.
80 \  Interview, worker in conservancy, Ngaremara, 10 May 2017.
felt that the Samburu were able to use the conservancy 
security to their advantage to recover stolen livestock, 
while Borana cattle were rarely recovered. 75  It was 
not entirely clear, but interviewees suggested that 
conservancy teams were also assisting with security 
outside conservancies when the need arose, as noted 
by youths, “[NPR] are in every village; we have four to 
five, when cattle rustling occurs we combine with the 
conservancy. We get help from [Lewa conservancy]. 76  
Interestingly in Biliqo in Chari, the communities were 
informed that the conservancy ‘guns’ are supposed to 
provide them with security. 77  Previous research con-
curred that conservancy teams at times do assist the 
police since they are better equipped (Mkutu & Wan-
dera, 2013).
In the conservancies run by NRT, there are 814 
rangers, of whom around half are said to be armed. 
Table 4 gives the numbers of rangers in each conserv-
ancy in Isiolo in 2016. However, this does not give the 
number of those who are armed.
Source: Kenya Wildlife Conservancies Association, 2016.
According to an interview with a local adminis-
trator working with Isiolo County in 2018, these num-
bers may have slightly increased and are expected to 
increase further in view of the advertised recruitment 
of 60 rangers. 78  There is also the disputed Shaba con 
 
75 \  Interview senior county administrator Isiolo Isiolo, 17 October 2018.
76 \  Focus group discussion with youths, Isiolo Holding Ground, Isiolo, 
2018; Ian Craig is the founder and former director of NRT. This needs 
further research.
77 \  Peace worker and researcher, email communication, 13 June 2019.
78 \  Phone interview, county government official, 22 November 2018.
Table 4 
Rangers in conservancies in Isiolo in 2016
Conservancy Number of rangers
Oldonyiro 21
Leparua 16
Nakuprat-Gotu 28
Nasuulu 26
Biliqo-Bulesa 36
TOTAL 127
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An administrator said:
They are illegal, but the government knows this. 
Without small arms you cannot keep cattle; you will 
not move with the rest. You call a peace meeting, and 
you see guns. 86 
A peace worker explained that gun owners are 
not usually organised into a force but will organise 
themselves when necessary. 87  Amongst the Borana, 
elders play an important part in mobilising and guid-
ing raids, conflict resolution with neighbouring 
groups and in collecting and enforcing penalties 
against community members accused of crimes. 
“Young people cannot raid on their own,” said an 
elder, although they sometimes do, as happened in 
the notable Kom case in 2017 above. In one instance 
during a drought in 1999, when the community was 
preparing to move into Samburu, in anticipation of 
conflict, elders made inventories of guns, ensuring 
that every boma (homestead) had at least one gun 
and 100 bullets. 88 
The use of guns may be subject to strict commu-
nity norms and rules, but sometimes still allows 
youths to steal independently. 89  It was noted, for  
instance, that Samburu youth use the generation gap 
and act, using their arms, independently of elders. 90 
The Borana eldership structure, however, is still strong; 
it is known as the Gadaa which has a committee and 
system known as the Dedha to govern grazing decisions. 
This highlights a level of local leadership which is 
relevant to the complex “layers of conflict” and also 
in peacebuilding, since Borana elders have often been 
involved in the latter. 91
Guns play an important role in exacerbating  
cattle raiding conflict and its impacts. Militias may 
organise to raid large numbers of cattle, or small 
raids may be organised as the ‘need’ arises, and these 
are often met by revenge raids. Furthermore, in previ-
ous studies, guns have been seen to facilitate market- 
 
 
86 \  Interview, county administrator, north Isiolo. 7 May 2017.
87 \  Interview, peace worker, Isiolo, 19 September 2018.
88 \  Phone interviews with Borana Council of Elders and a peace worker 
in Isiolo, 3 December 2018.
89 \  Focus group discussion with chiefs from Isiolo town, 10 May 2017.
90 \  Interview with senior government administrator, Isiolo town, 9 May 
2017.
91 \  Focus group discussion with elders, Kula Mawe, 19 October 2019.
When NPR's contract with the investor ceases for 
whatever reason, it is possible that they turn to other 
income-generating activities such as private security 
work, for which they can use their security training— 
a widely observed phenomenon among demobilised 
armed actors elsewhere on the continent. Such a  
development raises concerns about the militarisation 
of society (Ogwang, 2018).
Four, this privatised model of security provision 
may not be in the interests of everyone. There are  
human rights concerns about the conduct of rangers; 
conservancy rangers have been accused of “killing a 
lot of people” 81, an allegation which deserves further 
examination. Finally, conservancies are becoming  
desirable for communities specifically for their secu-
rity function and the ability to cement land claims 
through armed security; this has already lead to an 
increase in the militarisation of the county and 
hence, the potential for violent conflicts. As one offi-
cial put it “NRT has a standing army…Borana are  
accepting conservancies out of fear, out of the need 
for arms”. 82
Community armed militias
Many residents in Isiolo are armed. 83  In terms of 
their numbers and availability, guns were at times 
likened to Panadol (painkillers which may be pur-
chased at any small kiosk) and water. 84  Illegal guns 
are an open secret, usually overlooked by the state, 
and considered absolutely essential for pastoralists of 
all ethnic groups due to aggressive cattle theft and 
lack of state security protection. Youths in the Isiolo 
Holding Ground explained:
It’s for protecting our wealth…the Samburu come 
with guns, and there is no government, no police, 
they only pick when we have deaths. Instead of wait-
ing for the police, you have the gun to help you. 85 
81 \  Interview, Borana elder, Isiolo, 19 October 2018.
82 \  Interview, a civic educator, County Cohesion Department, Isiolo, 
17 October 2018.
83 \  Focus group discussion, county ward administrators, Isiolo town,  
9 May 2017; Interviews Kinna and Duse by local administrators and 
youths. 10 May 2017; Interview a senior national government officer,  
9 May 2017.
84 \  Interview, Administration Police officer, Kinna, 10 May 2017.
85 \  Focus group discussion with youths, Isiolo Holding Ground, Isiolo, 
2018.
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driven raiding activities, managed by elite beneficiaries, 
and even create a class of “warlord” elders or elites 
who hire young men and arm them for this purpose 
(Krätli & Swift, 2003).
Kula Mawe in Kinna ward, near the Meru border, 
is an example of an area with a reputation for its 
fierce and well-armed militia. Elders said:
All the brave men come from Kula Mawe. They are 
the only people that take everyone head on. They own 
a lot of arms, move around with livestock frequently. 
They move to Meru, Samburu and take them head on.92 
A local administrator in this area confirmed this, 
noting: “You will not find a manyatta (settlement) 
without ten or more guns.” "These", he added, "were 
seasonally used to attack the Meru (people)". 93   
Another administrator concurred and also revealed 
that these militias are receiving political support:
In Kula Mawe, we have Borana and Somali militias 
for hire or a standing force. They are funded by all of 
the leaders in / from Isiolo. Here, cattle rustling is 
also a major problem, and it is believed that militia 
from Kula Mawe steal your cattle and then disappear 
into thin air. 94  
The high number of arms in Kula Mawe is linked 
to the historical Shifta War, 95  since it was a settlement 
where some people were able to find refuge and escape 
forced villagisation. As an elder said, “1967 finished 
people… watu waliuawa (people were killed)…only a 
few people came here”. 96
Armed community militias are a longstanding 
phenomenon in all communities, fulfilling both  
defensive and aggressive functions. Their persistence 
is related in part to the lack of state security structures 
in remote areas (Human Rights Watch, 2002a).  
The role of elders is important in the organisation,  
resourcing and community legitimacy of these militias, 
but at times, these act outside of the authority of elders. 
Sometimes political leaders assume an “eldership”-type 
role in providing arms, and probably in directing 
their activities. 97
92 \  Focus group discussion with elders, Isiolo, 17 September 2018.
93 \  Interview, local senior national officer on the ground, Kula Mawe, 
18 October 2018.
94 \  Interview former senior county government administrator, Isiolo 
town, 8 May 2017.
95 \  Interview, security guard, Idafin, Isiolo, 18 August, 2018.
96 \  Interview with an elder aged 70, Kula Mawe 18 October, 2018.
97 \  Interviews with elders, names and place withheld, Isiolo 19 October 2019.
Insurgents and terrorist armed groups
AL SHABAAB
Isiolo has become one of the recruiting grounds 
for Al Shabaab due in part to its status as a major 
town with good road links with the north-east and 
Somalia. In 2018, a car was apprehended in Merti and 
found to be carrying seven AK47s with 30 fully loaded 
magazines, 18 IEDS, 36 unprimed grenades and para-
phernalia associated with Al Shabaab en-route to  
Nairobi (Ombati, 2018a). Activities by Al Shabaab take 
place undercover where they actively radicalise and 
recruit young people, mainly boys/men. According to 
a local community-based organisation, as many as 40 
youths are estimated to have left schools in Isiolo, 
such as Isiolo Boys, St. Paul’s and Barracks schools, to 
join Al Shabaab in Somalia, with a few joining ISIS. 98  
The leader of the most recent January 2019 attack on 
a hotel in Nairobi, in which 21 people were killed, was 
said to have been raised and later radicalised in Isiolo 
(Reuters, 2019; Malalo, Humphrey, & Duncan Miriri, 
2019). Recruiters play on grievances of young people 
and often use marginalisation and other injustices 
perpetrated against Muslims to make them join up. It 
is possible that the Meru–Isiolo border conflict and 
dispossession from pastoral land will feed into re-
cruitment narratives and push more young people 
into accepting the usual offer of money by recruiters 
since similar factors of exclusion and cash incentives 
are observed elsewhere. 
OROMO LIBERATION FRONT (OLF)
The Oromo Liberation Front has a presence in 
Merti and also Wajir County. 99  The OLF was estab-
lished in 1973 by the Oromo nationalists in Ethiopia 
to promote self-determination for the Oromo people 
within the Oromia region. They hold that they have 
been oppressed by the Amhara. Amnesty Internation-
al (2014) notes that the OLF (and its armed wing, the 
Oromo Liberation Army, OLA, formed in the 1970s), 
was one of several armed groups that fought against 
the previous Ethiopian government of Mengistu. 
98 \  It should be noted that though the youths were recruited from 
schools within Isiolo County, not all of them were from the county. 
Sensitization of Communities on Radicalization and Empowerment 
Solutions (SCORES).
99 \  Interview, peace worker, Isiolo, 19 September 2018.
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When Mengistu was overthrown in 1991, the OLF was 
briefly part of a transitional government led by the 
Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF) coalition. However, the OLF has always had 
an uneasy relationship with the Tigray People's Lib-
eration Front (TPLF), the most influential political 
party in the coalition, leading to fragmentation in 
1992 and the outlawing of the OFL as a terrorist 
organisation (Amnesty International, 2014). 
The OLF in Isiolo had a loosely organised struc-
ture and a reputation of having well-trained fighters 
who, are generally inactive and integrated with com-
munities. They also mobilise to reinforce Borana 
community militias when necessary. 100  At the time 
of writing, however, the OLF has recently been granted 
political space and given an office in Addis Ababa, 
which may provide the incentive to demobilise its 
fighters (Associated Press, 2018).
Organised crime and banditry
Banditry has been part of the security landscape 
for decades (KNA, 1989) and is most common along 
the Kinna–Garbatulla road and the Isiolo–Madogashe 
Road. Small arms facilitate it (KNA, 1992), and unem-
ployment and poverty exacerbate the situation. 
Trucks carrying miraa (Khat) are the main targets.  
It is said to be a business worth an estimated KSh 50 
million (US $500,000) per day. 101  Transportation has 
to be rapid and efficient as the leaves rapidly lose 
their potency (Anderson, 2009). The trading route  
begins in Maua (Meru County) where trucks are piled 
high with large bundles and proceed along the Isiolo–
Madogashe road to trading centres in Wajir (Liboi) 
and Mandera, 102  and also to the Somalian and Ethio-
pian borders. On rare occasions, the miraa trucks also 
carry arms on their return. 103  Bandits are very active 
along the Isiolo–Madogashe route, such that night 
travel is almost impossible. 104  The brewing of the 
  
100 \  Interview, peace worker, Isiolo, 19 September 2018.
101 \  Interview, sub-county administrator in Kinna, 16 October 2018.
102 \  Peace worker and researcher, email communication, 13 June 2019.
103 \  Peace worker and researcher, phone communication, 13 June 2019.
104 \  Interview, sub-county administrator in Kinna, 16 October 2018.
potent and illegal chang’aa (local brew) is another 
type of organised crime in Isiolo. A county adminis-
trator noted that Bulla Pesa in Isiolo town was a hot-
spot for brewing, which may be contributing to rising 
crime in the area including prostitution, thefts and 
killings (Mkutu et al., 2017). Some poaching is also 
taking place in the county. 105     
In summary, the picture of armed actors in Isiolo 
is a colourful one, with state and non-state actors, 
acting both within and outside of their “legitimate” 
roles as protectors of communities, using defensive 
and aggressive violence. State actors are generally 
perceived as inadequate but also guilty of reactive 
and indiscriminate violence. The NPR are positioned 
in a grey area between state and non-state and are 
more trusted to protect community interests, while 
communities also rely upon their militias for defence, 
as even the NPR are thin on the ground. These militias 
and other illicit actors are well armed: How and 
where they acquire their arms is a matter of great 
interest, which will be explored in the following 
chapter.
Arms trade
The Small Arms Survey (2018) notes that Kenya is 
ranked 9th on the list of the largest holdings of civilian 
firearms in Sub-Saharan Africa, with an estimated 
750,000 firearms in civilian hands. 106  Only 8,136 have 
been registered by the licensing authorities (Small 
Arms Survey, 2018). The majority of guns are owned by 
pastoralists who carry them fairly openly and consider 
them essential for self-defence (Wepundi, Nthiga,  
Kabuu, Murray, & Alvazzi del Frate, 2012). Between 
2013 and 2015, Kenya mainly imported assault rifles 
(from a variety of countries), 10,719 in total (Holtom & 
Pavesi, 2018). While this section describes the details 
of the arms supply into Isiolo, it is worth taking a  
historical and regional view first.  
105 \  Interview, ward administrator, Isiolo town, 9 May 2017.
106 \  Nigeria, South Africa and Angola rank 1st to 3rd respectively. Kenya’s 
neighbours South Sudan and Somalia from where many of Kenya’s 
illicit arms are believed to stem take 6th and 7th place. Ethiopia and 
Uganda do not feature in the top 10.
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Guns have been present in East Africa since the 
late 19th century. They were brought in by Arab mer-
chants and traded for local goods (Wepundi et al., 2012), 
mainly since the 1866 Italo-Abyssinian war (Lamphear, 
1994). During the post-colonial period and the Cold 
War period, a succession of civil wars and interstate 
wars in the Greater Horn of Africa countries, namely 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Uganda and South Sudan 
led to a massive number of small arms making their 
way into illegal local markets. Some arms in use date 
from as far back as the colonial period. Somalia and 
South Sudan still remain unstable: African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 107  forces have been 
stationed in Somalia from 2007 onwards, and it was 
intended to withdraw them from 2017 on, while the 
Kenyan forces carried out their own offensive in 2010 
(Healy & Bradbury, 2010). Al Shabaab continues to make 
regular incursions and has undercover cells and do-
mestic links in Kenya (Anderson & McKnight, 2014). 
South Sudan is also unstable, and there are ongoing 
refugee movements (Moschetti, n.d.) and arms sup-
plies from the country (Mkutu, 2017). The Ethiopian– 
Eritrea peace accord signed in July 2018 ended two 
decades of enmity. The demobilisation of the Oromo 
Liberation Front bases at Sololo (in Moyale town on 
the Ethiopia border) and around Merti (Saa, 2019) may 
also lead to arms sales. Regarding Uganda, which has 
been a source of arms in the past, the Ugandan govern-
ment has currently created military posts every eight 
kilometres, which has reduced cross-border conflicts 
and arms movements considerably (Mkutu & Lokwang, 
2017).
Arms trade in Isiolo County
TYPES OF ARMS AND PRICES
The most common guns in civilian hands are 
listed below. The G3 is a semi or fully automatic German- 
made assault rifle which is highly accurate and power-
ful but has the disadvantage of being heavy. It is  
 
107 \  AMISOM is a peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union. 
It was created by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council in 
2007. Its largest component is military, with troops drawn from Uganda, 
Kenya, Burundi, Djibouti and Ethiopia. It is now in the process of han-
ding over to Somali security forces. See www.amisom-au.org.
issued to the Kenyan armed forces and some police 
personnel, as well as NPR. The Russian-made AK47 is 
also semi or fully automatic and is the most widely 
used assault rifle in conflicts worldwide. It was dis-
tributed widely by the then Soviet Union to sympa-
thetic rebels and regimes (Killicoat, 2007). It is light, 
simple to operate and versatile, being able to with-
stand a range of conditions while other guns over-
heat and malfunction. The M16 is also an automatic 
assault rifle which is issued by the British Army; it is 
not clear how these arrive in Kenya. Pistols are small 
guns which can be semi-automatic, and also have the 
advantage of being easily concealable, while carbines 
are short-barreled versions of standard rifles (Small 
Arms Survey, n.d.). 
Prices (see Table 5) vary according to a number of 
reasons, including conflict or threat of conflict, often 
due to upcoming elections, which increases demand108  
and hence the price. It has been said that currently 
there is high demand which may be due to fears of 
loss of land to mega-projects and immigration 109  and 
could also relate to the border conflict with Meru.  
Table 5 shows a drop in price for the AK47 from 
2014/2015 which may be related to a slowly increasing 
availability from South Sudan after the onset of war 
in December 2013. The G3, being a government-issued 
weapon, tends not to fluctuate in price because it is 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 \  Focus group discussion with Interfaith Network, Isiolo town, 
8 May 2017.
109 \  Interview, peace worker, Isiolo town, 20 November 2018.
Table 5
Estimated prices of arms 2014–2018 
Type Year and costs in KSh (US dollars)
2014/15 2017 2018
AK47 150,000 (1500) 80,000 (800) 120,000 (1200)
M16 150,000 (1500) 120-150,000 (12-1500)
G3 150,000 (1500) 150,000 (1500) 120-150,000 (12-1500)
Carbine 100,000 (1000) 60,000 (600) 100,000 (1000)
Pistol - - 70,000 (700)
Sources: Mzee wa kijiji (village elder) FGD, peace group, Kinna, 9 May 2017; Inter-
view, name withheld, peace worker, Isiolo, 20 November 2018; Mkutu et al., 2017 and 
Mkutu & Boru, 2018.
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less subject to market forces. Guns may also be paid 
for in animals, as has often been the case in times 
past, but cash is preferred. 110  Ammunition is expen-
sive at around 150 to 200 KSh (US $1.50–2) per bullet.111  
Prices can go up to 300 KSh (US $3) at times of conflict. 112 
ILLICIT SOURCES, ROUTES AND MEANS OF TRANSPORT
Isiolo town is a small arms hub, together with 
Moyale (on the Ethiopian border) El Waq (on the bor-
der of Mandera County with Somalia), and Mandera 
town itself (Sabala, 2002). It is well recognised that 
with its strategic location, Isiolo serves Nairobi and 
other parts of the country, as well as the county itself 
with a ready supply of arms from its neighbouring 
northern countries. Improvements in road links have 
made this easier. In 1997, a market known to be a 
“small arms supermarket” was closed down by the 
Kenyan police, but this did not stop the illegal trade 
(Human Rights Watch, 2002b). Known routes into 
Isiolo include Ethiopia through Moyale and Marsabit, 
Somalia through El Waq and Wajir, and South Sudan 
through Turkana and Samburu (counties) (Mkutu, 
2008). A peace worker said that South Sudan is now 
becoming the most prominent source. 113  More spe-
cifically, there is a route into Kinna and Kula Mawe 
through Legdera in Garissa County 114  and another 
from Dadaab refugee camp to Madogashe on the 
(Isiolo–Garissa border) and into Garbatulla and beyond. 
Burat was said to be an important site for arms sales.115
The most common guns, the G3, AK47 and pistols 
are said to be mainly trafficked by boda boda (motor- 
cycle taxis) from Ethiopia through Marsabit, and are 
sometimes trafficked by refugees. 116  At times, cars 
are used for two purposes: miraa is sent by landcruiser/ 
 
 
110 \  Mzee wa kijiji (village elder) in FGD with peace group, Kinna, 9 May 
2017.
111 \  Comment made by Chairman of Minorities in FGD, county ward  
administrators, Isiolo town, 9 May 2017.
112 \  Interview, sub-county administrator in Kinna, 18 October 2018.
113 \  Focus group discussion with the Peace Secretariat, 19 October 2018.
114 \  Interview, peace worker, name withheld, Isiolo town, May 2017.
115 \  Interview, county administrator, County Cohesion Department, Isiolo, 
17 October 2018.
116 \  Interview, peace worker, name withheld, Isiolo town, May 2017; it 
was not clear whether these are genuine refugees or arms traders 
hiding amongst refugees.
jeep from Meru to Garissa and Moyale, and arms are 
carried in the same car as it returns. 117  From Garissa, 
they may be carried on camels, while from all areas 
they may also be carried on foot through open bush-
land. On the route from Dadaab, an interviewee noted: 
“There is open space, there are no roadblocks, it is just 
bush, one can just carry arms with no problem”. 118  
Near Isiolo town, guns are transported by boda boda. A 
member of a boda boda association revealed: 
The kids go to Ameret, Isiolo and Ngaremara forests 
and transport guns. You are paid five to ten thousand 
[KSh] for transporting one gun to Meru side…This is 
how the Meru are able to rustle cattle in Turkana 
County. 119
 He added that sometimes the same riders are 
victims of theft and even murder in Meru. A peace 
worker concurred that especially pistols arrive from 
Ethiopia into Eremet near Ngaremara and the boda 
boda riders then transport them into Isiolo town and 
other areas. 120 
State and para-state armed groups within Kenya 
may often supply citizens with illicit arms. Arms may 
be borrowed from friends or hired from police or NPR.121 
Because NPR are poorly tracked, arms are rarely  
recovered once a reservist has retired or died. Instead, 
it is passed on to a male, or even a female relative 
(Mkutu & Wandera, 2013). 122  
A few examples illustrate the movement of weap-
ons in Isiolo. In October 2017, a police driver and his 
boss were stopped at a roadblock along the Northern 
Bypass in Nairobi and arrested for allegedly trafficking 
illegal firearms from Isiolo to Nairobi. In their gov-
ernment car was a sack of charcoal that contained 
AK47 rifles with no bullets; notably, these types of  
rifles are not registered in Kenya (Ghetto Radio, 2017).  
 
 
 
117 \  Mzee wa kijiji (village elder) in FGD with peace group, Kinna, 9 May 
2017; FGD with Interfaith Network, Isiolo town, 8 May 2017.
118 \  Interview, sub-county administrator in Kinna, 18 October 2018.
119 \  Interview, boda boda operator, Isiolo town, 8 May, 2017.
120 \  Phone communication, peace worker, 19 November 2019.
121 \  Interview with a village elder, Kinna, 9 May 2017. This has been  
observed in previous research in other counties, see Mkutu & Wandera, 
2013.
122 \  This was said by a district administrator in Laikipia in 2012.
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Respondents recalled an incident in the previous 
week in which a fight broke out between two men, 
one of whom was a Borana and the other a Somali. 
One was an NPR and produced a weapon. When he 
was arrested, it was found that he had 16 bullets of 
the type given to KDF personnel. 123 
Several respondents believed that the British 
Army is inadvertently a source of arms to locals. 
“They leave a lot of firearms and ammunition, and the 
community get them.” 124  Some even seem to suggest 
that British Army personnel passed on the M16 arms 
present in the community. 125  There have also been 
reports of thefts (Webb, 2016; Daily Nation, 2004). 
These allegations are worth further research. 
Arms may also be sourced and given out by politi-
cians. 126  A peace worker noted that this had hap-
pened in Ngaremara and Kula Mawe. 127  A politician 
had used funds from the Community Development 
Fund to do this 128  particularly for the Turkana. 129   
According to one informant, Meru communities have 
been given large numbers of guns (between 200 and 
1,000 were noted) to guard their cattle, but some have 
used these to raid. 130  According to an interview, they 
were provided with a further 35 guns in late 2018, but 
these were taken by Borana pastoralists from Kula 
Mawe, an audacious act which has triggered a local-
ised arms race between the two groups. 131  The follow-
ing comment from a senator during parliamentary 
proceedings acknowledges the open secret of arms 
transfers by politicians.
…it is time for us, as leaders, to look at the role we 
have played in inflaming sensitivities and arming 
some of the communities that have lived in peace 
with each other for a long time. I was told that there 
123 \  Interview, an administrator, County Cohesion Department, Isiolo 
town, 17 October 2018.
124 \  Interview, senior county official, Isiolo town, 8 May 2017.  Interview, 
peace worker, Ngaramare, 18 November 2018; Comment made by Chair-
man of Minorities in FGD, county ward administrators, Isiolo town, 9 
May 2017. A conservancy worker also noted this in an interview.
125 \  Interview, a peace worker, Ngaramare, 18 November 2018.
126 \  Interview senior, county official, Isiolo town, 8 May 2017.
127 \  Interview, peace worker, name withheld, Isiolo town, May 2017.
128 \  Interview senior county official, Isiolo town, 8 May 2017; corrobora-
ted by a manager of a private security company, Isiolo town, 16 October 
2018.
129 \  Interview, Chair of boda boda association  (Mosque side), 12 May 2017.
130 \  Interview, an elder, name withheld, 19 October 2018; Interview, a 
county official, name withheld, 20 October 2018.
131 \  Interview, official, name withheld, October 2018.
is one former member of parliament (MP) whose ani-
mals are being guarded by illegal arms. I have asked 
for details and evidence on this, but I have not gotten 
it. However, where there is smoke, there is fire… 
When the county administrators say that we are the 
ones who are arming these people, then we must look 
in the mirror and find out what our role is in all this 
and how we can help….Recently, we have seen an in-
crease in the number of small arms infiltrating the 
different communities… My appeal is that, as leaders, 
even as we hold our other arms of government ac-
countable, we should also look at ourselves and see 
what role we have played in inflaming insecurity in 
our areas. We should hold ourselves with the same 
accountability that we demand of our policemen and 
county administration (Hansard, 2018).
Last but not least, elders may also be involved in 
sourcing arms for youths. 132
Ammunition is worth considering separately be-
cause understanding its sources and routes can pro-
vide efficient opportunities to address conflict, which 
relies on its steady supply, (even though addressing 
supply is inadequate without addressing factors 
which lead to the demand for ammunition). Bevan 
(2008) in his study of ammunition supply in Turkana 
in north-western Kenya notes that almost 50 per cent 
of ammunition in the hands of pastoralist militia 
come from Kenyan government sources through 
transfers involving the police. Cross-border ammuni-
tion trade from South Sudan and Uganda is another 
significant source. In 2010, 100,000 rounds of ammu-
nition were seized from the house of a businessman 
in Narok town, much of it bearing the mark of the 
government-owned Kenya Ordnance Factories Corpo-
ration in Eldoret (Wepundi et al., 2012). This raises 
many questions about state transparency and con-
trols. It must also be noted that in the North Rift areas 
of Kenya and Uganda, ammunition has become ‘con-
vertible currency’ that is exchanged for alcohol or 
goods sold by local women (Mkutu, 2008).
132 \  Interview, former cabinet secretary for Isiolo County government, 
Isiolo town, 10 May 2017.
PASTORALISTS, POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS \ KENNEDY MKUTU  
34 \ \ WORKING PAPER 7  \ 2019
While the police are responsible for the supply of 
ammunition to NPR—ostensibly to protect against 
neighbouring pastoralist groups—it may give or sell 
some ammunition illicitly. The same is true for KWS 
rangers, Kenya Defence Force soldiers and prison  
officers, or the NPR who sell on or distribute it to  
other community members. 133  Politicians are also in-
volved in supplying bullets to their constituents. 134  
Some unspent ammunition is collected from the 
grounds of the British Army Training Unit in Kenya 
(BATUK) opposite Nakuprat-Gotu conservancy and 
sold on. 135  Wepundi et al., (2012) record in focus group 
discussions in Samburu County that ammunition 
may be given (similar to the Kenyan military) or sold 
at low prices from BATUK grounds. 
In summary, there are large numbers of civilian 
arms in Kenya’s pastoralist counties, Isiolo included. 
These are usually acquired illegally mainly from 
South Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia through estab-
lished routes into Isiolo markets. A comparatively 
small number of guns arrive through licit channels, 
through the arming of NPR and conservancy rangers 
(though this is on the increase), raising concerns 
about the ceding of a public good such as security 
into the hands of community members and elite  
actors with their own set of interests and better  
resources than the police. Ammunition arrives 
through both licit and illicit channels (which include 
state actors and politicians) and often from within 
Kenya itself. Arms and ammunition complicate con-
flict dynamics at every level and have an unfortunate 
link with politics as they facilitate the achievement 
of political objectives. Thus through the availability 
of small arms, the relationship between ethnicity,  
political power and armed violence is deepened further, 
as the author demonstrated in the Ngaremara case at 
the beginning of the Paper, in which politicians had a 
hand in manipulating the inter- communal conflict.
133 \  Interview with a village elder, Kinna, 9 May 2017.
134 \  Interview senior county official, Isiolo town, 8 May 2017.
135 \  Interview senior county official, Isiolo town, 8 May 2017; Interview 
peace worker, Ngaramare, 18 November 2018. (He managed to buy some 
of the bullets for us to be able to witness this.); Comment made by 
Chairman of Minorities in FGD, county ward administrators, Isiolo 
town, 9 May 2017.
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Isiolo has been a violent county with a history of 
inter-communal resource-based conflict and state- 
sanctioned violence from the colonial regime to date. 
The Shifta War and massacres carried out during the 
years which followed remain in the consciousness of 
many older residents, while ethnopolitical conflict 
between the many ethnic groups has long been an 
important dimension of inter-communal conflict 
when politicians inflame local feelings and sponsor 
arms and ammunition to communities. There are new 
emerging violent conflicts related to Vision 2030 and 
the development of infrastructure, while devolution 
has raised the stakes in existing land and boundary 
conflicts with counties hoping to benefit. Altogether 
there is a complex layering of factors which are diffi-
cult to separate, but which tend to produce conflict 
between different ethnic groups on the ground. The 
various “layers” or levels should be considered and 
addressed simultaneously.
The county is awash with arms which complicate 
conflict at every level; there is nearly one gun per  
civilian household. The county is highly securitised 
with several specialised police units, but this does not 
necessarily translate into greater effectiveness in 
terms of security. The regular police lack the capacity 
and resources to deal with cattle theft and other chal-
lenges consistently. They have tended to be either  
inadequate or overly reactive in a manner that recalls 
collective punishment from the colonial era. Com-
munities and state security have a relationship of 
mistrust and sometimes animosity; they do not work 
together; the gathering of intelligence becomes harder, 
and crime is not dealt with.
In terms of small arms supply, illegal arms origi-
nate from state actors within Kenya and from coun-
tries bordering Kenya including Somalia, Ethiopia 
and Southern Sudan, travelling the few long roads 
which converge upon Isiolo, a hub for the transfer 
and sale of arms. Ammunition is acquired from state 
security, amongst other sources, through misman-
agement and corruption. On the demand side, the 
main motive for the acquisition of arms or deploying 
armed police reservists is to establish a balance of 
power with other ethnic groups in the protection of 
property (cattle), in the absence of an effective state 
presence. As a northern pastoralist said: “our ATMs 
are our cattle”, and ATMs need guards, of course. This 
is not to say that aggression is not also a motive for 
acquiring arms, but often, arms races are driven by 
fear and the need for self defence. The fact that there 
are many arms in the community which are not in 
active use supports this assertion. It is essential to 
look at those factors which create a high demand for 
arms. Short-term strategies to manage the leak of 
ammunition may provide a useful mechanism for  
reducing the magnitude of armed conflict.
Conservancies are quietly becoming another 
means of arms proliferation and sometimes a con-
tributor to resource-based intercommunal conflict. 
The conservancy model is actually placing arms  
directly into the hands of people who are community 
members, albeit professionalised ones. The model is 
increasing in popularity partly for the sake of its  
security dimension and has gone beyond the conven-
tional model of wildlife protection, raising several  
security governance concerns. This is an area which 
deserves further research work. 
In conclusion, the Paper suggests that while there 
are many arms in the county that escalate conflicts, 
more attention needs to be paid to the various layers 
of conflict, in particular, the emerging factors which 
could lead to those arms being used. Probably the big-
gest conflict risk is the struggle for political power 
and control over the benefits of development, along 
with the danger of displacement and exclusion of 
pastoralists by those same developments. Isiolo has 
communities whose economic, political and security 
needs are not being met, and increasing outbreaks of 
conflict are likely. A careful, inclusive conflict-sensitive 
approach to development is essential but is unlikely 
to happen if leaders look for personal power and gain. 
Conclusion
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ACLED Armed Conflict Location Data Project ACLED
AP Administration Police AP
ASTU Anti-Stock-Theft Unit ASTU
ATPU Anti-Terrorism Police Unit ATPU
DC District Commissioner DC
FGD Focus Group Discussion FGD
GSU General Service Unit GSU
IHG Isiolo Holding Ground IHG
KNA Kenya National Archives KNA
KNBS Kenya National Bureau of Statistics KNBS
KPR Kenya Police Reserve KPR
KSh Kenya Shilling KSh
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